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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FEES IN PUBLIC
INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Joseph H. King, Jr.* and Zygmunt J.B. Plater**
I. Introduction
The successes of environmental protection law to date —
limited though they are in the light of continuing systematic
disregard of environmental values-can in large measure be at
tributed not to governmental or corporate sectors of our society
but to the public. Aroused citizens, operating without institu
tional power bases against immense odds, have forced their envi
ronmental concern on the legislatures and agencies, and have
kept pressure on both polluters and the government through the
courts. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ' for ex
ample, has become asignificant force in compelling federal agen
cies to consider the best interests of the nation before promoting
their various projects. Yet the Act's evolution was not the work
of the agencies towhom Congress had directed NEPA nor of the
President and the Council on Environmental Quality who were
to oversee the Act's operation.' Rather, the evolving statutory
interpretations of NEPA's broad applicability and its require
ments of extensive fact-finding, disclosure and adequately
balanced decision-making have been hammered out in a series of
public interest citizen suits, often, ironically, against the efforts
• B.A Pennsylvania State University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Assistant
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opmions ofcounsel ,n litigation in which he may also have participated as counsel.
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^ The authors gratefully acknowledge the editorial comments of David M. Kirstein,
1. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et sea. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as NEPA] The Act was signed by President Nixon on JanuaryY 1970 „d became
effective on that date.
2 No sanctions to assure agency compliance appear on the face of the Act- the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) receives and reviews copies of all impact state
ments under sections 4322(c) [hereinafter referred to as section 102(2)(c)] and 4344(3)[hereinafter referred to as section 204(3)], but Presidential action is the only implicit
sanction and appears never tohave been exercised for environmental reasons
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of protesting agency defendants.3 Citizen environmental suits are
equally important in other federal and state statutory areas, and
in common law actions where courts today are successfully adapt
ing traditional common law forms of action to the most modern
environmental problems.4
The importance of citizen involvement inenvironmental pro
tection continues to grow with thenation's recognition ofenviron
mental problems and commitment to solving them. If citizen
suits are impeded, an important catalyst to the enforcement of
statutory and administrative obligations is lost, and environmen
tal offenses too numerous to be litigated by government are al
lowed to go unchecked.
The current revolution in citizen standing provisions,5 how
ever, has not meant that public interest litigants have been able
to solve the serious problems ofenvironmental decision-making
at any level of society. Private and governmental resource deci
sions continue, as a rule, to be made in narrowly insular terms,
ignoring the full real external costs of each project.6 Citizen litiga-
3 See eg United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973) (standing); Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (environmental impact statement|hereinafter referred to as EIS] preparation); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (alternatives that must be considered in an EIS);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (all of the above); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wise. 1972)(substantive effect); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728
(E.D. Ark. 1971) (retroactivity).
4. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505(d), 33
USCA § 1365(d) (Supp. 1973); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 § 105(g)(4) 33 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. 1973) (ocean dumping); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 § 304(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857(h)-2(d) (Supp. 1973); Noise Control
Act § 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911(d) (Supp. 1973); 35 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1201
et seq. (Supp. 1972). See the discussion of public nuisance and public trust doctrines in
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
5 See generally Sax, supra note 4. The most dramatic expansion of citizen standing
in environmental cases came in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where the
Court granted standing to citizens who alleged a highly abstract injury no greater than
that of the general public arising from a railroad rate hike that discriminated against
recyclable resources. The Court thus went beyond its Mineral King holding which had
restricted standing toplaintiffs alleging an individual injury. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1973).
6. Abasic problem in our nation's resource management systems isa general failure
of decision makers (whether bureaucrats, corporate polluters, or private citizens) tocon
sider consequences for which they are not held accountable (externalized costs). The goal
of rational environmental management thus is identification and consideration of all
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tion, despite its important role in making such projects account
for themselves according to long-term public interest criteria,7
can be sustained in only a minority of the situations requiring
judicial intervention. The character of our legal system poses
inherent limitations upon comprehensive public interest litiga
tion. The opportunity to litigate arises from a fortuitous combina
tion ofmany uncertain elements. These include timely discovery
of the issue, individual dynamism, adequate time to litigate, a
sufficiently strong rule of law and clear factual question to make
litigation practical, a supportive political climate, the availabil
ity of factual information and technical advice, and energetic
legal services. Unfortunately the elements converge in too few
cases.
In an area incapable of accurate quantification, we suspect
that the predominant factor inhibiting meritorious public inter
est environmental litigation is the lack of money. Since in most
cases plaintiffs are defending a diffuse public right instead of
private interests and seek injunctions rather than damages, they
cannot rely upon any financial recovery to defray the extensive
costsof litigation.8 The money spent defending the public interest
is their gratuitous and often sizeable gift to the public.9 The legal
work may involve complex and novel questions requiring trial
preparation, litigation time, and often elaborate expert testi
mony. Without independent wealth, outside sources of support,
or the potential for monetary recovery, public interest plaintiffs
must either find lawyers who can and are willing to donate large
amounts of time, or else give up without a hearing.
economic and non-economic costs in the decision-making process, a goal only partly
served by citizen litigation. See Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions
21 Stan. L. Rev. 383 (1969).
7. Citizen intervention cannot ensure rationality inspecific cases, as when agencies
may proceed under NEPA with wasteful and injurious projects so long as they accurately
document these effects according to section 102 procedures. See Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps ofEngineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973)
(Gillham Dam).
8. Damages are possible, notably in environmental litigation, under tort theories
like private or public nuisance. Attorneys' fees are not necessarily barred in such situa
tions if they are available under an established equitable exception. See note 218 infra
and accompanying text. Damage recoveries, of course, have the unfortunate attribute of
redressing people rather than the degraded environment itself.
9. Volunteered time is equally a private subsidy for the public interest. Neverthe
less, billed time alone can amount to large sums. See note 216 infra and accompanying
text.
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The traditional American rule developed in private interest
litigation over the years has been that litigation costs, including
both attorneys' fees and expert witness' fees (which are subject
to most of the reasoning and suggestions presented here)10 are not
recoverable in the absence of statutory authority. The burdens of
litigation costs lie where they fall and are notshifted tothe losing
party. The courts of equity, however, have developed several
major exceptions to the general no-fee rule, and many public
interest environmental cases appear to present a particularly
compelling occasion for exercise of such equitable discretion. In
a series of non-environmental cases allowingrecovery of litigation
costs without statutory authority, courts have held the no-fee
principle inapplicable where certain general equitable principles
apply. Such is often the case where the losing party has demon
strated bad faith or "obdurate behavior," where the litigation
protects or creates a "common fund," or where plaintiffs have
played the functional role of "private attorneys general."11 While
these categories are not exhaustive, they are the primary ration
ales for awarding litigation costs in environmental cases. Ofthe
three, the last appears to offer the most comprehensive and com
pelling arguments.
Though litigation costs have been awarded in a variety of
other areas of the law, notably civil rights and labor cases, the
principle is only recently and tentatively being extended to envi
ronmental cases.12 Despite the fact that environmentalists are
relatively recent phenomena in the courtroom, they offer judges
10. Several cases indicate that expert witness' fees are equally available when at
torneys' fees are awarded. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'lBank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939),
or even more liberally, Pyramid Lake PaiuteTribev. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C.
Memorandum opinion and order astocounsel fees, filed June 22,1973) (Itshould be noted
that the principal Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe Opinion was reported in 4 B.N.A.
Environment Rep.—Decisions 1714 (D.D.C. 1972); La RazaUnidav. Volpe, 57F.R.D. 94,
102 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Note that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), which specifically authorizes
recovery of fees against federal defendants, does not mention expert witness' fees. In view
ofthe fact that counsel fees areexpressly excluded from thestatute, one could argue that
thefailure tosimilarly exclude witness fees implies that they fall within theauthorization
of the legislation and are recoverable. But cf. Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Wit
ness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1250 n.162 (1973).
11 See Part II infra; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
12. Most notably La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Other
major cases are Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745 (W.D.
Tex. 1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed June
22, 1973).
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sitting in equity convincing reasons to adjust an old rule to mod
ern litigants in a modern natural setting.
Since the recent first appearance of non-statutory fee-
shifting inenvironmental litigation, an increasing number ofsuch
cases has been thrown into the judicial hopper, with few reported
out so far and many more to come.13 This article then must be a
preliminary examination14 in the interim before a substantial case
law has developed. The argument for environmental fee-shifting
in many cases appears compelling. Without judicial efforts to
facilitate public interest litigation, the environment may prove a
threatening and unforgiving force in a more elemental forum.
II. Counsel Fees in the United States in the Absence of
Statutory Authorization
As a general proposition, the American practice does not
provide for the award ofcounsel fees to the prevailing party as a
matter of course.15 The English system, on the other hand, does,
subject only to the dispensations of the trial court's discretion.'«
The American rule, like so many other American legal principles,
may be explained best by reference to the contemporary English
rule at the time the United States was growing out ofits colonial
status.
A. Historical Perspectives
1. The English Rule
InEngland, theaward ofcosts (including attorneys' fees) was
historically subject to the distinction between law and equity.17
No costs were awarded to the litigants in the absence of statute
under the very early English common law.18 It was only in 1275
13. See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
14. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the power ofan administrative
agency toaward counsel fees inenvironmental litigation. See discussion inGreene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425-27 (2d Cir. 1972).
15. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 717 (1967); 1M. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees § 12:3, at 464-66 &n.26 (1973), and cases
cited therein.
16. 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice H 54.70[2], at 1302 (1972).
17. Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849, 851 (1929).
18. See2F. Pollock &F. Maitland,TheHistoryof EnglishLaw 597 (2d ed.1898).
Under the early common law, only the crown benefited from fee-shifting. "Iftheplaintiff
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with the enactment of the Statute of Gloucester19 that a success
ful plaintiff was awarded his costs from the opposing party. By
160720 defendants were also entitled to recover costs to the same
extent as plaintiffs. The final development came when the Su
preme Court of Judicature Acts of 1873 and 187521 were passed,
which left the award of costs up to the discretion of the court.
This legislation in effect meant that a successful litigant might
be deprived ofhis costs "for good cause."22 Thus, costs in actions
at law were usually awarded to the prevailing party unless cir
cumstances warranted a departure from the usual practice. The
English rules with respect toactions at law have not significantly
altered in concept since the Judicature Act of 1875.23
The English equity rule on costs and fees, however, varied
from the common law. Even before the Acts of 1873 and 1875,
fee-shifting in equity was discretionary and did not conform to
the rule at law.24 Thereafter, the rule for both courts was nomi
nally the same—the award depended on the exercise of the
court's discretion. Presumably, however, the historically broad
base of the chancellor's equitable discretion and the long-stand
ing tradition at law for the award to abide the result left the
equity practice much closer to a true "discretionary" approach.
This was especially the case since the Lord Chancellor's power,
though not without statutory basis,25 was probably inherent.26
failed in his action, he was amerced pro falso clamore; ifhe succeeded, the defendant was
in misericordia for his unjust detention of the plaintiff's right, but was not liable tothe
payment of any costs of suit . . ." Goodhart, supra note 17, at 852. See also Hullock,
Law of Costs 2 (1793).
19. 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1275).
20 4Jac. 1, c. 3 (1607). Professor Goodhart explains the delay ingiving costs to the
successful party as perhaps being due to the fact "that the amercement of the unsuccessful
plaintiff was considered asufficient punishment" though of little consolation to the victo
rious defendants. Goodhart, .supra note 17, at 853.
21. 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (1873); 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1875).
22. Goodhart, .supra note 17, at 854.
23. See C. McCormick, Law of Damages 234 (1955); McCormick, Counsel Fees and
Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619, 620 (1931).
24. See, e.g., Jones v. Coxeter, 2 Atk. 400 (1742) and note 26 infra.
25. See 17 Rich. II, c. 6 (1394).
26. See Goodhart, .supra note 17, at 854. The power of American courts sitting in
equity, while deriving some authority from express statutory grants of power to award
counsel fees in particular litigation, is as a general matter inherent in the court. See, e.g.,
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
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2. The American "No-Fee" Rule
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect ofthe relationship ofthe
American and English rules is the fact that American develop
ments so closely tracked the English model yet ultimately pro
duced such a different result. At the time of the American Revo
lution, the English practice regarding costs became part of our
early common law.27 Thus, there were no attorneys' fees on the
law side recoverable in the absence of statute, which is still the
general rule in the United States.28 Possibly out of deference to
the English approach, a numberofAmerican jurisdictions there
after enacted statutes codifying what was essentially the English
statutory approach.29 These statutes, however, evidenced one
major dissimilarity from the English prototype—they prescribed
a fixed fee for the services of counsel. This divergence of the two
systems became manifest as gradual economic changes were not
accompanied by increases in the prescribed counsel fees.30 Ulti
mately, mere passage of time rendered the fixed attorneys' fees
little more than nominal sums. This development led one writer
toattribute theemergence of theAmerican no-fee rule toa "grad
ual forgetting rather than [to the result of] a deep-seated moral
judgment."31
3. Evaluation of the "No-Fee" Rule and Its Economic Bias
Perhaps the emergence of the unique32 American rule can be
27. 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at K 54.70[2J, at 1303.
28. See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
29. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8710 (1953); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 261 § 23
(1968); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 525, § 13 (1955); N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. 10 § 4 (1829)-
Act of Feb. 22, 1821, Pub. L. No. 50, § 2Pa. Stat.Ann. tit. 17, § 1635 (1962); Act of 1694'
2 South Carolina Cooper's Statutes 86. The attorneys' fees prescribed in the above
statutes ranged from a $1 fee under the New Hampshire act to $3.75 for certain specific
services ("arguing every cause") under theNew York legislation. For a discussion ofthese
early statutes see Goodhart, supra note 17, at874; McCormick, supra note 23, at620-21;
Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand L Rev 1216'
1218-19 nn.13-16 (1967).
30. See Manko v. City of Buffalo, 271 App. Div. 286, 302, 65 N.Y S 2d 128 143
(1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 905, 72 N.E.2d 623 (1947), where thecourt recognized that theNew
York statutory limit for costs does not realistically compensate aparty, and acknowledged
the existence of the fiction that "it has been the public policy of this State from time
immemorial, to regard them as adequate."
31. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society 54 Calif
L. Rev. 792, 799 (1966).
32. It appears that the United States is one ofthe few industrialized nations of the
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explained as historical accident. Others surmise that it is a reflec
tion of the nineteenth century American distrust of lawyers,33 or
possibly a product ofan intense colonial American idealism and
the belief in the right to sue without the in terrorem effect of the
threat of an adverse award of counsel fees.34 These explanations
may account for the origin of the rule, but not its continued
vitality.35
Arguments, usually of questionable validity and soundly
criticized, can be made that the American rule has survived be
cause of its inherent merits. It is said that the no-fee rule encour
ages litigation by not threatening litigants with theiradversary's
counsel fees;36 that counsel fees are too remote, too difficult of
ascertainment, and potentially too exorbitant;37 and that the use
of fee shifting to penalize and deter bad faith litigation might be
lost if fees were awarded as a matter of course.38 A rash of criti-
world, certainly one of the only leading common law or civil law countries, that rejects
the award of counsel fees as a general rule. See id. at 797. See also McLaughlin, The
Recovery ofAttorney's Fees: ANew Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 Fordham L.
Rev. 761, 782 nn.108-14 and authorities cited therein. Seegenerally 1962 Proceedings of
the ABA Section on International and Comparative Law 119-31 (1963).
33. See Goodhart, supra note 17, at 873.
34. SeeNote, supra note 29, at 1220. Seealso Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379
U.S. 227, 236 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
35. Counsel fees are generally still not recoverable in the United States today. The
state of Alaska is a notable exception. See Alaska Stat. § 9.60.010 (1973).
36. Thisargument was rejected in Ehrenzweig, supra note 31, at 797; Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fees: Why Not a Cost ofLitigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75, 82 (1963); McLaugh
lin, supra note 32, at 782-83. At the outset it has been observed that if the English rule
would in fact reduce the amount of litigation, that factor alone would not be a valid
criticism. On the contrary, sucha reduction in the American courts would be welcomed.
See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 783. A more likely consequence ofadopting the
English rule might be a desirable shift in the identity ofsome parties bringing the litiga
tion, with greater participation by the poor. See Goodhart, supra note 17, at 874-76, and
text accompanying notes 49-52 infra. Moreover, one might argue persuasively that the
threat ofan award of counsel fees might have the further therapeutic effectofencouraging
amicable settlements. See Kuenzel, supra, at 78-80.
37. For criticism of most of these speculations see McCormick, supra note 23,at 639-
41; McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 780-81 nn.96-98 andcases cited therein. Determination
of a reasonable attorney fee presents no more of a barrier to the finder of fact than any
other difficult question requiring resolution. The fear that attorneys might be tempted to
charge anexorbitant fee ignores thefact that thecourt would determine not only theright
to the fee, but its amount.
38. This argument takesintoaccount the deterrentor penalaspectofthe "obdurate
behavior" exception to the no-fee rule which isdiscussed at pp. 36-43 infra. Thefact that
attorneys' fees might be awarded as a matter ofcourse, however, would not necessarily
exclude consideration of a party's bad faith when setting the amount ofthe fee or the use
of the court's contempt powers. Furthermore, the award of counsel fees as a matter of
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asm" of the no-fee rule began a half a century ago,4" inspired by
Professors Goodhart41 and McCormick,42 but was little heeded or
regarded until the last ten years when the commentators again
spoke out in favor of the English rule.43 The most popular reasons
for adoption of the English rule are that it fully compensates the
successful litigant by allowing him to recover for his often sub
stantial expenses for counsel,44 it discourages specious claims45
and encourages meritorious ones by the threat or promise of reim
bursement of one's counsel fees.46
The consistency ofthe attack on the no-fee practice leads one
to ask whether there might be another more elusive explanation
for the rule. Anaive and superficial inquiry might assume that
the two systems, though different, are nevertheless equally just
in that they operate uniformly as they affect individual litigants
within their respective systems. Thus, under the English rule
either party is chargeable with costs, while in the United States
neither party is. This reasoning is a tautology, however. The two
systems appear strikingly different in their grossly disparate
treatment ofthe rich and poor classes ofsociety.
As a general proposition it should be stated that in signifi
cant litigation most defendants are solvent or they would not be
defendants. If the poor participate in the judicial process at all
curse would many event discourage dilatory conduct by a party since the higher costs
incurred by his opposition would inevitably increase the extent of his ultimate liability
Thus, under the English rule, the deterrent effect of threatened fee-shifting remains but
is simply less selective in its effect.
39. See, e.g., Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees be Allowed?, 13 Calif. St BJ 42 (1938)-
Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees be Allowed?, 26 Calif. St. B.J. 107 (1951)- Goodhart'
supra note 17; McCormick, supra note 23; Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of
Damages 15UC,n. L. Rev. 313 (1941). But see Note supra; Satterthwaite, Increasing
Costs to be Paid by Losing Party, 46 N.J.L.J. 133 (1923).
t .u4V THo firSt Wi,dely Publicized objection to the American rule is generally attributed
to the hirst Report ofthe Judicial Council ofMassachusetts, 11 Mass L 0 7 (1925) Spp
Note, .supra note 29, at 1216.
41. See generally Goodhart, supra note 17.
42. See C McCormick, supra note 23, at 255-59; McCormick supra note 23
43. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 31; Kuenzel, supra note 36; Stirling
Attorney s Fees: Who Should Bear the Burden?, 41 Calif. St. B.J. 874 (1966)- Stoebuck
Counsel Fees Included in Costs: ALogical Development, 38 Colo. L. Rev 202 (1966)'
Note, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 593 (1967); Note, supra note 29.
44. See, e.g., Rodulfa v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1969)- 6J Moore
supra note 16, at If 54.70(2], at 1304.
45. See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 17, at 876; Kuenzel, supra note 36, at 78-80
46. See, e.g., 6J. Moore, supra note 16, at If 54.70(2], at 1304.
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(aside from criminal cases), it is usually as plaintiffs. These tend
encies take on major significance when evaluated in the context
of the no-fee rule. Some courts have observed (or perhaps ration
alized) that the American rule could be supported on the ground
that under the English rule the poor "might be unjustly discour
aged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the pen
alty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel."47
This supposition, however, atbest ignores reality. The poor plain
tiff without prospect of a large damage award tospawn a contin
gent fee arrangement48 cannot realistically consider invoking thejudicial process. Even if they embark on such an improvident
course, such plaintiffs' chances of success in wars of attrition
against an affluent defendant are often remote at best. And, as
suming the two preceding obstacles are overcome, any reward for
plaintiff's perseverance is usually largely consumed in legal fees.
The converse English rule provides a contrast to the bleak
picture for the underprivileged painted under the American no-
fee rule.49 There, it is the wealthy defendant who laments that, if
he loses on the merits (which, assuming plaintiff's greater access
to the judicial process and enhanced longevity in the litigation
context, becomes at least a credible prospect), he will be taxed
with plaintiff's counsel fees. On the other hand, ifdefendant pre
vails against a poor plaintiff, he may find plaintiff judgment-
proof when he seeks to recover attorneys' fees.
It might be argued, simplistically, that since both systems
have their inherent inequities, why not, out of concession to the
power of the actual, simply adhere to the present rule? This ap
proach ignores two basic considerations. First, the English rule is
self-policing to the extent that not many attorneys will take an
unmeritorious case for an impoverished plaintiff since counsel
fees would not then be forthcoming from either party. More im
portantly, under the English system, at least the wealthy individ-
47 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
48 For a comprehensive discussion of the contingent fee device see F. Mackinnon,
Contingent Fees for Legal Services (1964). Ithas been suggested that the unwillingness
of some lawyers to give up contingent fees may account in part for the reluctance to adopt
the English rule which would presumably obviate the need for contingent fees. See Note,
.supra note 29 at 1226. Cf. Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical Where Client is Able
to Pay aRetainer?, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 329 (1959); Note, Lawyer's Tightrope-Use and Abuse
ofFees, 41 Cornell L.Q. 683, 699-700 (1956).
49. See Goodhart, supra note 17, at 874-76; Stoebuck, supra note 43, at 202.
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ual can still avail himself of effective participation in the judicial
process, a benefit not shared by the poor plaintiff under the
American rule and against which the hardships posed by occa
sional judgment-proof plaintiffs pale into insignificance.50
It is apparent that the present no-fee practice offers little
solace for the plight ofthe poor31 or even middle classes52 who face
increasingly impenetrable barriers to effective participation in
the legal process. Despite proposals for change,53 there are no
signs that significant legislative innovations in the basic no-fee
rule are imminent. When we consider this against the backdrop
of the growing unresponsiveness of big government, the correla
tive need for public interest litigation by privatecitizens becomes
even more compelling. It is in this setting that we evaluate a
number of rapidly developing exceptions to the no-fee rule that
have evolved in response to the growing need for public interest
litigation.
50. Untoward effects, often resulting in self-help, have resulted from a systematic
exclusion of the populace from the judicial process. See Cappelletti, Social and Political
Aspects of Civil Procedure—Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe 69
Mich. L. Rev. 847, 873 (1971).
51. See Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 381 (1964); Goodpaster, The Integration ofEqual Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right to Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223 (1970); O'Brien',
Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 1
(1967); Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to
Limit Caseload, 46 J. Urban L. 217 (1969); Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of
Indigents to the Courts, 57 Geo. L.J. 253 (1968); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil
Litigation, 66Colum. L. Rev. 1322 (1966); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to
the Indigent, 56 Geo. L.J. 516 (1968); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
76 Yale L.J. 545 (1967). Seealso McLaughlin, supra note32. The effect ofthe no-fee rule
on the plight of the poor in America must be read against our stated national policy which
is aimed at the elimination of the "paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty ... by
opening to everyone the opportunity ... to live in decency and dignity." Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1970).
52. See Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters:
The Problem, The Duty, and A Solution, 26U. Pitt. L. Rev. 811 (1965).
In recentyearscommentators havealsoexpressed growing concern about the financial
barriers to effective public participation in the regulatory process. See, e.g., Cramton,
The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative
Process, 60 Geo. L.J. 525, 537-46 (1972); Howell, Financial Barriers to Public Participa
tion in the Regulatory Process, 14 Wm. &Mary L. Rev. 567 (1973); Lazarus &Onek, The
Regulators and thePeople, 57Va. L. Rev. 1069, 1096-1105 (1971).
53. Seeauthorities citedin notes 39-43 supra. For one example ofa proposed statute
altering the no-fee rule see Stoebuck, supra note 43, at 211-18.
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B. Exceptions to the No-Fee Rule
The Supreme Court in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. u. Maier
Brewing Co/'4 recently reiterated the no-fee rule and two of its
older exceptions: "[Attorney's fees are not ordinarily recovera
ble in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
therefor."55 There have developed, especially in the last few
years, a number of widely recognized exceptions to this general
no-fee rule. The most pervasive exceptions have been statutory.
These include provisions for a mandatory award of counsel fees
in favor of successful plaintiffs56 and in some situations where
plaintiffs seek only to enforce orders of administrative agencies.57
Other statutes give the court discretion to award fees to the pre
vailing parties in certain instances regardless of whether they are
plaintiffs or defendants.58
54. 386 U.S. 714(1967).
56 S«'cUyton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Truth in Lending Act 15
U.S.C § 1640(a) U970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. , 216(b) (1970) Civi
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000a-3b (1970); Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §941(c)
,1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1986, 46 US.C. §^ .^^T^^1934, 47 U.S.C. §206 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C §908(b)i (1970),
Housing and Rent Act, 50 U.S.C. §1895(a), (b) (1970); Defense Production Act 50 U.S.a§2109(c) (1970). For adiscussion of the statutory exceptions to the, no-fee.rule that are
cited supra and in notes 57-8 infra, see 6J. Moore, supra note 16, at 1 54.71[2] at 1378-
85. Anumber of state statutes that provide for the award of counsel fees are collected in
Stoebuck, supra note43, at 209-10 nn.56-69. .57 Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (Secretary of Agncu-
ture); Perishable Commodities Act, 7U.S.C. §499g(b) (1970) (Secretary ot Agriculture);
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 163(p) (1970) (Railway Adjustment Board); Shipping Act
of 1916 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1970) (Federal Maritime Commission); Interstate Commerce
Act 49U SC §§ 16(2), 908(b) (1970) (Interstate Commerce Commission).
' 58 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (cost may be assessed against
either party where court believes suit or defenses were without merit); Trust Indenture
Act 15 USC § 77ooo(e) (1970) (court may in certain cases assess reasonable attorneysfees' against either party, "having due regard to the merits and good faith of the claims or
defenses made by such party litigant."); Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78.(e)
784(a) (1970) (attorneys' fees in cases involving manipulation of security prices and mis-
leading statements); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §116 (1970) (reasonable attorneys fees
may be awarded in favor of the "prevailing" party in an action for copyright infringe-
ment); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §285 (1970) (reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded
to the prevailing party in exceptional cases); Serviceman's Readjustment Act, 38
U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970) (reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded to the successful
^Certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ate.permit the award.of
counsel fees for failure to make discovery. See Rules 26(b)(3)(c), 30(d), 33(a), 34(b), 36(a),
and 37(c) Other statutory provisions permit the court to award costs in certain situations
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In addition to the purely statutory exception to the no-fee
rule, a number of time-honored exceptions have evolved where
the parties have provided for attorneys' fees by a valid contrac
tual provision,59 in certain admiralty cases,60 civil contempt pro
ceedings,61 divorce actions,62 and in some cases where the prior
wrongful conduct of the defendant has caused plaintiff to incur
legal expenses in defending or prosecuting an otherwise unneces
sary lawsuit against a third party.63
The most dynamic exceptions to theAmerican rule, however,
derive from an exercise ofthe courts' inherent equitable powers64
with which the American courts were endowed as a result of their
English heritage.65 Equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule have
been sanctioned "when overriding considerations of justice
seemed to compel such a result."66 These exceptions have been
to avoid other abuses of the judicial process. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1970) (provid
ing for the payment of costs where a case was removed from astate court improvidently
and without justification); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C. § 926
(1970) (a party who prosecutes a suit without reasonable ground will be liable for costs).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 156 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1946);
C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 253; McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 769 n.44, and cases
cited therein.
60. Usually, where attorneys' fees areawarded in admiralty theyare included as an
item ofcompensatory damages. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co 386
U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); 1 M.
Speiser, supra note 15 at § 12.10, at 483-85; Andrews, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees
and Damages in Civil Contempt Proceedings in Illinois, 47 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 211 (1970);
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 793 (1972).
62. See C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 241; Note, supra note 29, at 1228 n.61, and
cases cited therein.
63. See C. McCormick, supra note 23, at 246-53; McLaughlin supra note 32, at 768
n.37, and cases cited therein.
64. In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939), the Courtstated that
"the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litiga
tion other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original authority of the
chancellor to do equity in a particular situation."
65. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939). For an
extensive scholarly treatment ofthe English derivation ofthe inherent equitable powers
ofthe American courts sitting inequity see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S.Ry., 28
F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd onother grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
66. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
The Fleischmann opinion went on to note, however, that the "recognized exceptions to
the general rule were not . . . developed in the context of statutory causes ofaction for
which thelegislature had prescribed intricate remedies." Id. at 719. Today, in light ofthe
developments in theobduracy, common fund, and private attorney general exceptions, it
is clear that their underlying rationales present such "overriding considerations" as to
justify bypassing the no-fee rule and its purported advantages. See generally notes 36-81
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invoked in three general situations which some courts have char
acterized as the "obdurate behavior," "common fund," and"pri
vate attorney general" exceptions67 to the no-fee rule. The scope
of equity's power, determined according to the historical tradi
tions of equity as an institution,68 is "broad indeed."69 Apart from
possible statutory limitations70 the tendency has been for the
court to regard its equitable power essentially as an "instrument
for nice adjustment and reconciliation between public interest
and private needs as well as between competing private claims."71
The foregoing equitable exceptions developed both indepen
dently and by cross-fertilization, beginning with the obdurate
behavior cases and culminating in the enlightened notion ofthe
private attorney general. The evolution, though incomplete,
serves as an ongoing tribute to the responsiveness and ingenuity
of private litigants to a sorely felt need in the judicial process.
1. Obdurate Behavior
a. The Traditional Equity Policing Rule
The "obdurate behavior" principle necessarily grew out of
.supra and accompanying text.
67. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
68. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 404 (1971)
(Harlan J concurring); Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1946).
69. ' Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 404 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring). See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ, 402 U.S. 1
(1971). In Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946), the Supreme Court observed
that "the comprehensiveness of [the district court's] equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence ofa clear and valid legislative command."
70. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), the
Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether to award petitioners reasonable
attorneys' fees based on an exception to the no-fee rule that had developed in trademark
infringement cases. Apparently, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970), a
number of cases had established precedent to support the award of counsel fees in the
absence ofany express authorization. After a thorough review ofthe statutory scheme and
its "meticulously detailed . . . remedies," 386 U.S. at 719, the Court held:
|W|hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly pro
vides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not read
ily be implied.
Id. at 720. Notwithstanding the Fleischmann Court's holdingthat the remedial provisions
of the Lanham Act had marked "the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in
cases arising under the Act," 386 U.S. at 721, the Supreme Court in later cases appears
to have recanted somewhat and awarded fees despite the relevant statute's silence on that
point. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970).
71. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
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the equity court's broad supervisory powers to police its lawsuits
and its inherent powers to prevent injustice. Thus, the power to
award counsel fees has been recognized both when "gross charges
of fraud and misconduct have been made and not sustained .
[and] where the main ground of the suit is false, unjust, vexa
tious, wanton, or oppressive."72
The long-standing history of the obdurate behavior excep
tion, rooted in the tradition of the English Chancery,73 rendered
the exception more palatable to the no-fee-minded American
courts. Despite its inherent limitations, it has been instrumental
in conditioning judicial attitudes for acceptance of other more
universal and therapeutic principles to ameliorate the no-fee rule.
Following wide recognition of the obdurate behavior principle,
some courts began to look to considerations other than the obdur
acy ofone of the parties for guidance in determining whento shift
counsel fees.
A case illustrating the traditional obdurate behavior rule is
City Bank ofHonolulu v. Rivera Davila.7i After debtor defaulted,
the bank demanded payment and upon the guarantor's refusal to
pay the bank sued the guarantor. Following a judgment for the
bank, the district court ordered defendant to pay attorneys' fees
in the amount of $15,000, charging him with "obstinacy." The
court of appeals affirmed the award, noting that it had been
found that defendant had"greatly and necessarily prolonged the
trial byinjecting irrelevancies, byrefusing toadmit facts patently
true, and by making statements and later contradicting him
self."75
b. Antecedents of the Therapeutic Rules
The Rivera case is typical of one line of cases based on the
traditional "bad faith" rule designed to penalize a party for his
disregard of the legal process.76 Other modern cases, however,
72. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas CityS. Ry., 28F.2d233, 241 (8thCir.1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930). See 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at \ 54.77[2], at
1709, and cases cited therein; Note, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Suffi
cient to Award Fees from Third Party Beneficiaries?, 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 271, 272-73 n.6,
and cases cited therein.
73. See authorities cited in note 65 supra.
74. 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971).
75. Id. at 1371.
76. See, e.g., Universal OilProducts Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946),
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have evidenced a trend toward a more outward-looking approach,
precursing the therapeutic concepts ofthe common fund andpri
vate attorneygeneral rather than embodying the classic obdurate
behavior notions. In Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,71
plaintiff, a union member, sued his employer railroad and his
union to have a collective agreement, allegedly depriving plaintiff
and other black firemen of seniority and employment rights, de
clared void. The court of appeals, upholding the award of attor
neys' fees against the union, cited the classic obdurate behavior
cases,78 but then went on to reason that
plaintiffs ofsmall means have been subjected to discriminatory
and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor organization which
was required as bargaining agent, to protect their interest. The
vindication of their rights necessarily involves greater expense
in theemployment ofcounsel to institute and carry on extended
and important litigation than the amount involved to the indi
vidual plaintiffs would justify their paying.79
The Rolax case is significant in marking a departure from a
purely "internal" frame of reference vis-a-vis the lawsuit. In
stead, the courtshifted its focus away from the culpability of the
party litigants qua litigants to consider also the relevance ofde
fendants' extrajudicial conduct in the extended public interest
context. This "external" focus weighed not only the particular
plight of plaintiff in incurring disproportionately high counsel
fees in relation to his interest in the lawsuit, it also embraced the
beneficial effect the litigation promised to other union members.
This overview perspective was also present in a number of
school desegregation cases, typified by Bell v. School Board of
Powhatan County, Virginia.™ There the district court disallowed
attorneys' fees, despite its granting of plaintiff's request for in
junctive relief. The court of appeals, reversing, cautioned that
we must take into account the long continued pattern of evasion
where the Court observed that if a fraud were practiced on it, "the entire cost of the
proceedings couldjustly be assessed against the guilty parties." For a thoroughdiscussion
of the obdurate behavior rule as it is traditionally applied to supervise litigation see Note,
Useof Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78 (1953).
77. 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id.
80. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc).
1973| ENVIRONMENTAL COUNSEL FEES 43
and obstruction which included not only the defendants' un
yielding refusal to take any initiative [to end school desegrega
tion] ... but their interposing a variety of administrative ob
stacles to thwart the wishes of the plaintiff for a desegregated
education.81
These cases,82 and similar ones challenging voting malapportion
ment,83 while retaining a gloss of the "obdurate behavior" mantle
like Rolax, presaged the application of the "private attorney gen
eral" concept in fee awards.84
The "obdurate behavior" exception to the no-fee rule helped
to prepare the courts for socially-conscious applications of the
common fund approach and for the emergence of the private
attorney general theory. These developments, however, were
more offshoots of the obdurate behavior principle, than manifes
tations of its complete metamorphosis. The obdurate behavior
exception continues to offer a viable but limited exception to the
no-fee rule in its own right and on occasion may even justify fee-
shifting where nothing else will.85
2. The Common Fund
a. Development of the Rule
Fee-shifting based on a "common fund" theory, unlike ob
durate behavior, does not arise among a lawsuit's adversaries
inter se. Rather, it represents an allowance of fees more akin to
that "as between solicitor and client."86 The rule is invoked where
an individual has taken it upon himself to protect or create a fund
or a property right in which others have a legal interest. Under
such circumstances it has been thought only fair that such a
person should be reimbursed by the others for his reasonable
counsel fees.87
As the fund cases evolved, there was an expansion of the
81. Id. at 500.
82. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1972); Hill v.
Franklin County Bd. of Educ, 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp.
1375 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8thCir. 1968); Clark v. Board ofEduc, 369 F 2d661
(8th Cir. 1966).
83. See, e.g., Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
84. See discussion at pp. 48-57 infra.
85. See generally note 163 infra.
86. 307 U.S. at 165.
87. See 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at If 54.77[2J, at 1705.
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nature ofthe benefit that had to be conferred onthe otherbenefi
ciaries before fee-shifting was justified. The traditional applica
tion of the common fund doctrine appears in the original fund
case of Trustees v. Greenough.™ A bondholder sued the trustees
of a fund on behalf of himself and other bondholders similarly
situated. The fund had been pledged to cover interest on the
bonds and certain installments. ^Plaintiff, alleging that the trus
tees wasted and destroyed fund property by disposing of a large
part of the fund's land, was successful in setting aside some of the
conveyances. Thus, plaintiff's action benefitted other bondhold
ers by protecting the fund. The Supreme Court approved the
allowance of counsel fees to plaintiff's attorney, basing its deci
sion upon essentially two considerations. First, the Court enunci
ated an unjust enrichment rationale, stating that to do otherwise
"would not only be unjust to [plaintiff] . . . , but it would give
to the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the
fund an unfair advantage."89 The Court also reasoned that plain
tiff had served as an agent of the class.90
In the later case of Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,n
plaintiff sued individually to protect her interests incertain trust
deposits held by the bank's receiver. Here it was held that the
stare decisis benefit ofplaintiff's successful lawsuit to other bank
depositors was sufficient to invoke the doctrine. Despite some
differences, both Greenough and Sprague had a single overriding
element in common—in both cases there was a tangible fund
from which the plaintiff could draw his counsel fees. Soon, how
ever, the pressures exerted by the inherent inequity ofthe no-fee
rule began to force a mutation in the traditional common fund
approach. The courts, suffering under the constraints of the
American rule, not only looked backward to draw on obdurate
behavior principles, but also forward in anticipation of the pri
vate attorney general rule. The common fund theory thus
spawned two hybrid fund-type theories to support fee-shifting,
perhaps thereby further diluting thestarklines that once circum
scribed the traditional exceptions to the no-fee rule.
88. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
89. Id. at 532.
90. Id. at 533-35.
91. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,*2 named plaintiff, a minority share
holder in Schenley Industries, sued individually and on behalf
other similarly situated shareholders, alleging misleading repre
sentations concerning the value of an offer to acquire plaintiff's
stock in violation of section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19349:{ and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.94 Defendants
included Glen Alden Corp., which was attempting to acquire a
controlling interest in Schenley, and Rosenstiel, Schenley's con
trolling shareholder, who was also chairman and chief executive
officer. Plaintiff alleged that while Rosenstiel refused an offer
from another company because it would not pay a premium for
his stock, he accepted an offer from Glen Alden which met his
terms. Plaintiff also alleged that the Glen Alden offer to the other
shareholders did not match the price it paid to Rosenstiel. Before
the case reached trial, Glen Aldenraised its offer to the remaining
shareholders to a level comparable to the price paid to Rosenstiel,
thus, in effect, settling the controversy. Plaintiff moved for coun
sel fees from Glen Alden, which was not a member of plaintiff's
class. In denying plaintiff's motion, the district court held inter
alia that plaintiff had "failed to benefit the class" and "sought
counsel fees from the defendants rather than from a fund created
by his efforts."95
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that
plaintiff sought the "highly unusual relief of having counsel fees
paid [under a fund theory] by an adverse party."96 It neverthe
less reversed the district court and held that plaintiff's pleadings
stated a sufficient cause of action if proved to support an award
of counsel fees. The court not only reasoned that the common
fund exception was "not limited to circumstances in which there
is monetary fund,"97 but also looked to the conduct of the corpo
rate defendant to support the award. The court agreed that if
defendants had unilaterally settled the action "brazenly ignoring
Rule 23(e)"98 thereby foreclosing the creation of a fund from
92. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950
(1970).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1972).
95. 424 F.2d at 164. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969).
96. 424 F.2d at 167.
97. Id. at 166.
98. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides:
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which counsel fees could be recovered, the district court might
find it inequitable to deprive plaintiffofcounsel fees.99 In so hold
ing, the court of appeals created an unusual alliance ofobdurate
behavior and common fund concepts to justify fee-shifting
against an adversary unrelated to plaintiff's class.
The union of the common fund with notions of societal bene
fits reaching beyond the class has produced another and even
more significant "quasi-application"100 of the common fund
theory. It has found its greatest expression thus far in sharehold
ers' derivative suits,101 and is clearly in evidence in the much-
discussed102 case of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.m In Mills,
plaintiffs were minority shareholders who brought a derivative
suit under the 1934 Act104 challenging a corporate merger on the
grounds that shareholder approval had been influenced by a mis
leading proxy statement. Although, when plaintiffs moved for
award of counsel fees, they had succeeded in establishing their
cause of action, the Court recognized that the lawsuit "had not
yet produced and may never produce, a monetary recovery from
which the fees could be paid."105 Nevertheless, the Court, relying
in part on dicta from Greenough,m observed that reimbursement
had been permitted where three ingredients were present: (1) the
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposeddismissal or compromiseshall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
99. 424 F.2d at 168.
100. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 409U.S. 892
(1972).
101. See, e.g., Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions—
Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. Rich. L. Rev. 259 (1972); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 658 (1956).
102. Note, Securities Regulation—Allowance ofAttorneys' Fees in 14(a)Derivative
Suits, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 204 (1970); Note, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.: Proxy Viola
tions—The Causation Question and the Award of Attorney's Fees, 65 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854
(1970); Comment, TheAllocation ofAttorney's Feesafter Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
38 U. Cm. L. Rev. 316(1971).
103. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
104. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).Plaintiffs
also relied on Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972), which was promulgated under
section 14(a) and prohibits misleading proxy statements.
105. 396 U.S. at 392.
106. 105 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1881). There the Court noted that if for some reason
plaintiff "cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself, [the others entitled to participate
in the fund] . . . ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he has
fairly incurred."
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litigation confers a "substantial benefit"107 to the class; (2) the
class is an "ascertainable" one; and (3) the court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit makes possible "an award that
will operate to spread the costs proportionately" among the mem
bers of the class.108 The Court thus approved the award ofcounsel
fees despite the possibility that a monetary fund might never
reach fruition and that it might be impossible to assign monetary
value to the benefit received by the shareholders.109 Fee-shifting
was thought justified to encourage " 'corporate therapeutics,' "110
thereby vindicating the statutory policy in insuring fair and in
formed corporate suffrage.
The exchange of the hard "fund" approach of the earlier
cases for the more far-ranging "therapeutic" perspective of Mills
now finds adherentsnot only in subsequent securities litigation,111
but also in other areas like the labor field. In Hall v. Cole,112 the
Supreme Court in a recent 6 to 2 decision affirmed the lower
court's award of counsel fees in a lawsuit under section 101(2)(2)
of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.113 Plain
tiff had introduced a resolution at the regular meeting of his
union alleging various instances of undemocratic action and
shortsighted policies. The resolution was defeated and shortly
thereafter plaintiff was expelled from the union. In upholding the
award of counsel fees to plaintiff, the Court concluded that "by
vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by [the Act,
plaintiff] . . . necessarily rendered a substantial service to his
union . . . and to all of its members . . . [and also] dispels the
'chill' cast upon the rights of others."114
107. The "substantial benefit" testoriginated inBosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light
& Power Ass'n., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
108. 396 U.S. at 393-94.
109. Id. at 392, 396.
110. Id. at 396, quoting Hornstein, supra note 101, at 659, 662-63.
111. See, e.g., Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F
Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
112. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). Hall has been followed inotherrecent labor cases. See, e.g.,
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert, denied 412 U S
918(1973).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 412(a)(2) (1970).
114. 412 U.S. at 8.
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b. Limitations of the Common Fund Approach
Despite the broad public policy strokes of the Court in Mills
and Hall, and in their progeny, the true common fund cases are
by definition limited in their capacity to reach many goals in the
public sector. Notwithstanding the liberal "substantial benefit"
test signifying a move away from a monetary fund, the require
ment that there be an ascertainable class to whose members the
courts might look for reimbursement has survived. Thus, for
whatever else the recent common fund cases signify in their
outward-looking perspectives, the underlying concept remains
inextricably tied to its self-regarding roots—the mechanism that
produces the counsel fees must ultimately always look inward for
the source of the fees.
Conceptually, too, the dual objectives of some of the fund
cases in benefitting an identifiable and limited membership and
the vindication of human rights suggest a potentially mutually-
hampering effect retarding the accomplishment of either or both
objectives. Only by sheer coincidence can the degree of benefit to
a circumscribed class correspond to the quantum of societal
benefits generally. Thus, in fund cases like Mills, which adopt a
broad frame of reference transcending the boundaries of the in
stant class, the source of the justification for equity's private
attorney general rationale may be confused by the presence of
two benefitted entities. In effect, the microcosm of the fund and
the societal macrocosm, where both are recognized as justifica
tions for a departure from the no-fee rule, may exert competing
forces to shape the particular exercise of the court's equitable
discretion. In such instances, the interests of neither group re
ceives proper consideration under the common fund theory."5
3. The Private Attorney General
a. Origins of the Rule
Although the obdurate behavior and common fund rules
served a useful purpose in conditioning the move away from the
strict no-fee rule, they nonetheless fell short of many worthy
objectives of fee-shifting. The obduracy exception could even be,
115. Cf. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.) (Winter, J., concurring),
cert, denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
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and often was, a two-edged sword. Some courts, even in recent
cases,116 have sometimes been persuaded to deny counsel fees in
the absence of the requisite obduracy without considering the
other available justifications for fee-shifting. The common fund
cases likewise might draw on the obduracy of the parties for sup
port,M7 despite the fact that obduracy was not an essential ele
ment in the fund cases,118 thus confusing the rules. Even with the
broad policy-based opinions like Mills, the inherent limitaton of
the fund concept, tied as it was to the requirement for the deep
pocket of an accessible class, was beginning to be felt.
Smarting under the inherent and often arbitrary constraints
of the obdurate behavior and common fund rationales, the federal
courts sought a more direct justification for fee-shifting. Oddly
enough, they found it in a case construing an express statutory
grant of authority to award counsel fees. In Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc.,m plaintiff instituted suit under Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which gives the court discretion to
allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney fee.120 The court
of appeals denied plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, appar
ently construing the statutory prescription as merely a codifica-
ton of the obdurate behavior exception, limited to instances
where defenses had been asserted "for purposes of delay and not
in good faith."121 The Supreme Court reversed, holding:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of
securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus
private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under
that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunc
tion he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered
116. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 472F.2d 318(4th Cir. 1972), cert, granted, 412
U.S. 937 (1973); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972).
117. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, Glen Alden
Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950 (1970), discussed in the text accompanying note 92 supra.
118. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973), the Court pointed out that "neither the
presence nor absence of 'bad faith' is in any sense dispositive where attorneys' fees are
awarded to the successful plaintiff under the 'common benefit' . . . ."
119. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
121. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967),
rev'd per curiam, 390.U.S. 400 (1968).
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of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely
forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties
would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking
the injunctive powers of the federal courts.122
Although the "private attorney general" rule was not a com-
pletly novel concept in 1967,123 Piggie Park was its first explicit
application in a fee-shifting situation. The rule, as applied, re
lied for its policy justifications upon neither the bad faith of the
defendant nor upon the bestowal of some benefit upon an identi
fied class that might serve as the source of a fund for counsel fees.
Rather, the Court looked to the enforcement and vindication of
congressional policies "of the highest priority."
b. Further Development and Articulation of the Doctrine
While the public policy rationale of Piggie Park was persu
asive, its precedential effect was somewhat limited by the express
statutory basis for the award. Nor did the public policy underpin
nings of Mills with their inherent class-based limitations achieve
122. 390 U.S. at 401-02. The Piggie Park rationale was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in the recent case of Northcross v. Board of Educ, 412 U.S. 427 (1973), which also
involved an express statutory authorization for fee-shifting.
123. Associated Indus, v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943), illustrates the early application of the private attorney general concept in suits
against the government. The court, discussing "standing to sue," stated:
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an
actual justiciable controversy, to bring suit for judicial determination either of
the constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers conferred by a statute
upon government officers, it can . . . enact a statute conferring on any non-
official person . . . authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in
violation of his statutory powers .... [T]here is nothing constitutionally
prohibiting Congress from empowering any person ... to institute a proceed
ing involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the
public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals.
Id. at 704 (footnotes omitted); cf. Comment, Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in
the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 Yale L.J. 574 (1949).
Another example of the private attorney general concept is present in the qui tarn
actions. In such cases plaintiff sues a violator of a statute to recover a penalty for the
violation. The statute provides that the penalty shall be shared by any informer [the
plaintiff! who institutes such an action and the state. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (upholding constitutionality of federal informer's
statute); Grover v. Morris, 73 N.Y. 473 (1878); In re Barker, 56 Vt. 14 (1884); Kafin &
Needkman, The Use of Qui Tarn Actions to Protect the Environment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 130
(1971). See also Zirkle, Standing to Bring Environmental Actions: Qui Tarn and the
Refuse Act of 1899, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 459 (1972).
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the broad universality ofscope contemplated in the private attor
ney general rule. Yet, despite the limitations ofPiggie Park and
Mills, the combined chemistry of the two cases resulted in a
serendipitous synergy.
Although other cases both before124 and after125 Lee v. South
ern Home Sites Corp.12fi espoused a private attorney general
approach, Lee is perhaps the best expression to date of the poten
tiating phenomenon of Piggie Park and Mills out of which the
private attorney general grew. In Lee, a black citizen sought an
injunction and other relief against a private real estate developer
who had refused to sell him a parcel of land because of his race.
The district court entered judgment for plaintiff but failed to
award attorneys' fees. The court of appeals affirmed on the merits
but remanded the case for consideration ofplaintiff's request for
counsel fees.127 On remand the district court denied attorney fees
124. See, e.g., Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970) (civil rights
action based on policeconduct in obtaining an involuntaryconfession and unlawfuldeten
tion); Moore v. Knowles, 333 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (involving alleged denial of
due process to a suspended teacher); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex.
1971) (racial discrimination in housing; court relied on first Lee case: Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970)); Hammond v.Housing Authority &Urban
Renewal Agency, 328 F. Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1971) (discrimination against welfare recipi
ents in public housing case); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D. Minn. 1971)
(conspiracy to deprive Black citizens of civil rights by repeated arrests for alleged traffic
violations).
125. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 1972), cert, denied,
410 U.S. 955 (1973) (wrongful discharge ofchaplain at state mental hospital in violation
ofFirst Amendment—freedom ofspeech—rights); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d836 (5th Cir.
1972) (rejection of plaintiff's application for a position as golf pro on racial grounds);
Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1972) (lawsuit to stop inter alia justices of
the peace from trying traffic cases because ofofficial financial interest in the outcome);
Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955 (D. Hawaii 1972) (attacked county ordinance pro-'
scribing political signs as violative of first and fourteenth amendment rights); Newman
v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (action to secure better medical and
psychiatric treatment for inmatesat state mental institutions); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703, 709-10 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (exclusion ofBlacks from employment in Department
of Public Safety); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (reapportion
ment); Shull v. Columbus Municipal School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Miss. 1972)
(class action to force school district to permit unwed mothers to attend school).
Fora detailed summary ofa numberof the more significant privateattorney general
cases that both preceded and followed Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143
(5th Cir. 1971), see Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General":
Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in thePublic Interest, 24Hast. L.J. 733, 742-
55 (1973). See also Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in PublicInterest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 301, 321-31 (1973).
126. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
127. 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970).
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and the court of appeals reversed. Relying on the reasoning of
Mills and Piggie Park, the court stated:
The policy against discrimination in the sale or rental of prop
erty is equally strong [as the policy underlying the statute in
volved in Piggie Park]. The statute, under present judicial de
velopment depends entirely on private enforcement. Although
damages may be available ... in many cases there may be no
damages or damages difficult to prove. To insure that individual
litigants are willing to act as "private attorneys general" to
effectuate the public purpose of the statute, attorney fees should
be . . . available . . . .128
The forceful reasoning of the decision in Lee has served as a
rallying point for other public interest cases where fee-shifting
rationales do not fit neatly into the obdurate behavior or com
mon fund molds. The eradication of racial and other class-based
discrimination, taken as a national goal, was felt to present suffi
ciently compelling "overriding considerations" to warrant fee-
shifting even in the absence of a statutory prescription. The very
magnitude and intractability of the problem, both in terms of
sheer numbers as well as in its moral dimensions, called for ex
ceptional measures to encourage "private attorneys general."
Fee-shifting was the device chosen.
There is a basic similarity between the fund and private
attorney general exceptions in that each is based on an exchange
of a salutary piece of litigation for the reimbursement of counsel
fees. The difference lies in the class benefitted. In the fund cases,
it is a clearly defined and identifiable class from whom counsel
fees are readily extractable. In the private attorney general cases,
while there may be an ascertainable class, as in the racial dis
crimination cases, the benefit in large measure is held to accrue
to the society at large. The settings of the fund cases, in effect,
are thus from the standpoint of the benefitted class, microcosms
of the private attorney general; the latter simply operates on a
wider, nationwide scale.
This analysis also serves to highlight a basic difference be
tween the obdurate behavior exception to the no-fee rule and
many of the fund and private attorney general cases. In the ob
duracy situations, the award of counsel fees bears a direct rela-
128. 444 F.2d at 147-48.
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tionship to conduct deemed to be antisocial, and the violator
pays. The fund and especially the private attorney general cases
may also grow out of undesirable conduct; yet, in these cases it
is often the class—perhaps a corporation in a shareholder deriva
tive action or a governmental citizenry in an environmental
case—whose interests are vindicated and which bears the burden
of the fees. Under such circumstances, "fee-shifting" may strictly
speaking be a misnomer. "Fee-spreading" would be more accur
ate. This distinction illustrates a unique aspect of numerous com
mon fund and private attorney general cases—they are based on
what is essentially an involuntary attorney-client relationship.
This raises basic questions as to how far an equity court should
engage in fee-spreading that threatens to preempt participatory
democracy in institutions (or ascertainable classes) such as cor
porations, unions, or governments. One might also inquire as to
the efficiency of fee-spreading in redistributing benefits to a class
member or citizen for his contribution to the counsel fee award.
Articulation of the questions here does not presuppose an
easy solution. Empirical data, if available at all, might only com
plicate the calculus of the questions further. It would seem that
one possible answer may lie in adopting a less restrictive view of
participatory self-rule. On balance it appears that the fact of
voluntary membership in a corporation, union or governmental
constituency may itself be a sufficient expression of assent to
justify an involuntary participation in the costs of vindicating the
inherent interests and aspirations of the institution in question.
And more important, until the institution itself becomes respon
sive to its stated interests and goals, incentives to private attor
neys general in the form of fee-shifting (fee-spreading) may be a
necessary if not a perfect solution in an imperfect society.
Notwithstanding the conceptual sameness of the fund and
private attorney general rules, the latter, in view of its public
orientation, confers upon the court greater latitude in utilizing
the fee-shifting device. Thus, courts of equity "may, and fre
quently do, go much farther to give and withhold relief in further
ance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go where
only private interests are involved."129
129. Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 522 (1937).
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c. The Uncertainty of Bradley
The emergence of a direct means of fee-shifting responsive to
the need for vindication of strong congressional policies as typi
fied by Lee was challenged in a recent desegregation decision
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,130 which contains no provision
for attorneys' fees. In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,
Virginia,m after tortuous attempts by public-minded citizens to
end racial segregation in Richmond public schools, the school
board finally implemented a satisfactory desegregation plan.
Plaintiffs then moved for the award of counsel fees. The district
court rejected the application of the common fund approach to
school desegregation cases.132 Instead, in awarding fees, the dis
trict court looked to the obstinacy and unreasonableness of de
fendant's conduct133 and the important governmental policy134
advanced by the litigation.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
lower court's allowance of counsel fees on essentially two grounds.
First, the court held that an element of bad faith was essential
to the award of counsel fees in desegregation cases,135 and that the
record did not support such a conclusion in the instant case.136
Secondly, the court rejected the private attorney general ap
proach, distinguishing Mills, Piggie Park and Lee—Mills because
it was a fund case, Piggie Park because there was a statutory
prescription, and Lee because it was based on a civil rights stat
ute similar to one containing a counsel fees provision.137 The
court's arguments consistently misapprehend the substance of
the private attorney general concept. Unless the presence of bad
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
131. 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert, granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
132. 53 F.R.D. 28, 35-36 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert,
granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973), where the district court observed:
School desegregation cases, or any suits against governmentalbodies, do not fit
this fine model without considerable cutting and trimming. This is a class suit
... but to say that the plaintiff class will actually in effect pay their attorneys
if the school board is made to pay counsel fees entails a number of unproved
assumptions about the extent to which pupilspayfortheir freepublicschooling.
133. Id. at 39.
134. Id. at 41-42.
135. 472 F.2d at 320; see Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 949-51 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1892 (1972), and cases cited therein.
136. 472 F.2d at 320-27.
137. Id. at 329-30.
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faith is extraneous to the private attorney general rule, the latter
rule has no effect in and of itself. Disposing of Mills as a "fund"
case totally ignores the broad public policy foundation of the
opinion as well as its potentiating effect when combined with the
realism ofPiggie Park. The court's treatment ofLee is simplistic.
Of course all civil rights statutes are not fungibles and the stat
utes in Lee and Bradley are not the same, but that does not
negative the obvious—that Lee approved fee-shifting in the ab
sence of a statutory authorization, an ascertainable class from
which fees might be drawn, or manifest bad faith on the part of
defendant.
d. Future Prospects for the Private Attorney General
The immediate future of the private attorney general will in
large measure be ordained by the manner in which the Supreme
Court disposes of Bradley. Based upon the tenor of the Court's
recent decision in Hall v. Cole,m where obdurate behavior was
not an element at issue, as well as the perseverance of the lower
federal courts (guided by Piggie Park and Mills), it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will arrest what has been an arduous
beginning for the private attorney general principle in the past
decade.
The past year alone has witnessed the reach of the private
attorney general fee rule beyond the civil rights cases. One such
area is the environmental field where the doctrinal recidividism
of Bradley™ has been ignored by the courts. The sentiment140 is
138. 412 U.S. 1 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
139. 472 F.2d at 329 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added), where the court said:
If . . . the rationale of Mills is to be stretched so as to provide a vehicle for
establishing judicial powerjustifying the employment of award of attorney's fees
to promote and encourage private litigation in support of public policy as ex
pressed by Congress or embodied in the Constitution, it will launch courts upon
the difficult and complex task of determining [inter alia] . . . which public
policy warrants the encouragement of award of fees to attorneys for private
litigants who voluntarily take upon themselves the character of private attor
neys general. Counsel in environmental cases would claim such a role for their
services [citing, with trepidation, the strip mining case of West Va. Highlands
Conservatory v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971), where,
incidentally, plaintiffs never asked for counsel fees).
140. See, e.g., Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental
Litigation, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1222 (1973); Note, supra note 125, at 753-55; Comment,
Allocation ofAttorneys'Fees After Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co., 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316,
329-30 (1971).
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perhaps best expressed in La Raza Unida v. Volpe,m where class
action plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction
halting the construction of a federal highway because the state
and federal agencies had failed to comply with inter alia NEPA
and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966.142 The court, in a closely reasoned opinion by Judge Peck-
ham, held that plaintiffs were entitled to counsel fees, and relied
solely upon the private attorney general theory. This approach
has been followed in three other very recent environmental cases,
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,m Sierra Club
v. Lynnlu and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Envi
ronmental Protection Agency.145
The fate of the private attorney general exception promises
to carry with it not only the vigor ofpublic rights in a burgeoning
catalogue of public interest cases, but will perhaps affect the
future of the American no-fee rule. As such, the private attorney
general rule deserves the continuing attention of the courts and
commentators, and energetic application by the public interest
litigants.
4. Application in Nonfederal Cases
To date, the most innovative equitable departures from the
no-fee rule have occurred almost exclusively in federal courts in
cases directly or indirectly involving federal statutes. The ques
tion may arise whether the principles developed there must be
141. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
142. 49 U.S.C. § 1634 (1970). See LaRaza Unida v.Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Cal. 1971). o
143. Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed June22, 1973); cf. Committee to Stop Route 7
v. Volpe, 4B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1681 (D. Conn. 1972) (recognizing the
private attorney general concept but refusing to award fees on other grounds).
144. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
145. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1891 (1st Cir. 1973). Although there
was, according to the court, statutory authorization for the award, the court appeared to
rely'exclusively on the private attorney general concept to justify its departure from the
no-fee rule. Perhaps this was a reflection of the court's uncertainty of its statutory con
struction. See discussion in note 271 infra.
Inother environmental cases, thecounsel fees question ispresently awaiting decision.
See e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Civil No. 73-8174
(6th Cir filed July 5, 1972); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Environment
(CARE) v. Volpe, Civil No. 71-143 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324
(CD. Cal. 1973); cf. Tenants &Owners in Opposition toRedevelopment (TOOR) v. HUD,
Civil No. 69-3245 AW (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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restricted to the federal courts.146 Although it is beyond the scope
of this article to undertake a thoroughgoing review of state equity
courts' jurisdiction, it appears that the answer is "no."
The basis of equity jurisdiction in both state and federal
courts is the same: there are not two separate pools of equity
principles upon which the courts draw nor two separate trains of
decisions arising from the common base.147 On any given point
some state courts may happen to be in advance of the federal
courts or vice versa, but the differences are a product of circum
stances rather than an essential distinction. In practice, more
over, the same equitable principles that support the federal fee-
shifting decisions can be discerned in various state decisions
awarding counsel fees where bad faith exists, in common fund
situations, and in cases where a public interest is vindicated by
private litigants.148 Most of these cases are based upon general
statutory authorizations to award costs or damages, but since the
statutes involved do not specifically authorize attorneys' fees, the
judges'decisions to expand the statutory language and awardfees
are directly on point. Though the principles in state decisions are
not as fully articulated as in federal decisions, they are basically
the same. The arguments developed by the federal courts should
be equally applicable mutatis mutandis to cases arising under
state statutes and (where the same criteria are met) under the
common law.149
IE. Fee-Shifting Theories in the Environmental Setting
Though all three of the major rationales by which litigation
146. See Note, supra note 125, at 756 n.94.
147. That the federal as well as state courts draw from the common heritage of
English law and equity is evident on the face of the U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. See also H.
McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity 12 (1948).
148. See, e.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1st Dist. 1968); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 208 A.2d 677 (Del. 1964); Mencher v
Sachs, 164 A.2d 320 (Del. 1960) (common fund); Baya v. Central & S. Florida Flood
Control Dist., 184 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1966); G.M. Dykes Iron Works, Inc. v. Dehenffe, 131
So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 1961); Ready v. Ready, 33 111. App. 2d 145, 178 N.E.2d 650, 656 (1961)
(bad faith); Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. v. Hivdsten Transp., Inc., 268 Minn. 176, 128
N.W.2d 334 (1964). See also thenon-pecuniary fund state cases cited in Mills v Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 391, 395 n.22 (1970); Gilbert v. Local 701, Hoistings &Portable
Eng'rs, 237 Ore. 130, 390 P.2d 320 (1964); Channell v. N.C.R. Employees' Independent
Union, 28 Ohio App. 2d 260, 277 N.E.2d 85 (1971) (union therapeutics); Mandel v
Hodges, Civil No. 427816 (Alameda Super. Ct., filed Feb. 14, 1973) (private attorney
general) cited in Note, supra note 125, at 758.
149. See authorities cited in note 148 supra.
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costs are awarded have potential application in the environmen
tal law field, the first two—the obduracy and common fund theo
ries—will in fact often be superfluous owing to the availability
and force of the private attorney general principle.
A. Obdurate Behavior
Obdurate bad faith may often appear in situations where
polluting corporations or obstinate administrative agencies have
manifested a continuing disregard for clear legal mandates,
within or outside the subject court proceedings.
In the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe case,150 for example, the
District Court for the District of Columbia found that the Secre
tary of the Interior had violated his trust over native American
lands in permitting the deleterious commercial diversion of
378,000 acre feet of water away from thePaiute's sacred Pyramid
Lake. Although the principal opinion noted that "the Secretary's
good faith is not in question,"151 it based recovery of costs upon
the fact that during the course of the case his representatives
acted in an obdurate and intransigent manner refusing in good
faith to carry out the court's directives, and . . . unnecessarily
extended the litigation to the detriment of the tribe.132
The agency's conduct outside the instant litigation was also con
sidered relevant to the question ofbad faith. The court noted the
department's evasions of the requirements of water-allocation
decrees in other cases, and certain general administrative fact
finding duties that were not conscientiously undertaken.153 The
elements of this example—an administrative agency circumvent
ing certain limiting legislative directives inorder toimplement its
primary promotional objective—are sufficiently frequent in envi
ronmental situations to provide occasions for consideration ofthe
obduracy principle.154
150. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 4B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions
1714 (D.D.C. 1972); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C,
filed June 22, 1973).
151. 4 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1716.
152. Civil No. 70-2506 at 2.
153. 4 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1716-17. The courtdid notexplicitly
recognize the internal-external distinction; it is left open toquestion whether defendants'
bad faith in similar circumstances outside the instant litigation, without more, would be
enough to ground a finding of obduracy.
154. Other evidence of obduracy might be found in an agency's decision to work
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Likewise in the case of private defendants, evasion of envi
ronmental controls has been a common phenomenon over the
years. Corporate delays, variance attempts, and obstruction of
enforcement characterized a large percentage ofstate administra
tive control efforts until very recently,155 and such history will
often constitute grounds for application of the obduracy princi
ple. Common law actions may present the same elements. In
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert,m one of a series of aluminum
plant air pollution tort cases, defendant corporation had been
knowingly discharging fluoride emissions and refusing to install
available control devices. The court was prompted to levy puni
tive damages by the unusually forthright admission of one com
pany executive that over the years "it is cheaper to pay claims
than it is to control fluorides."157 This posture alone, the court
felt, justified applicaton of punitive damages; the factors recom
mending that exercise of judicial discretion would seem to apply
equallywell to the award oflitigation costsin similar situations.158
The shortcomings of the obduracy rationale for environmen
tal cases lie in considerations ofprocedure, policy and tactics. In
the Reynolds case above, for example, the problems of proof of
bad faith were substantially diminished by that polluter's unu
sual indiscretion in stating the evasive corporate policy for the
record. In most circumstances the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden
in proving bad faith would be much more difficult to establish.159
round-the-clock shifts to pour concrete ina dam orto channelize a river so that environ
mental alteration is irreversible by the time judicial review commences, or the construc
tion ofa highway right up to the boundaries ofa disputed natural site in order to
strengthen the case for building through the site.
155. Few comprehensive surveys have been made of state enforcement efforts
against private polluters, but the limited evidence available indicates that corporate
recalcitrance to clean up discharges may span as much as twenty years, with repeated
refusal to implement effluent limitations, violation of compliance schedules, etc.
Michigan Environmental Law Society, Survey of Michigan Water Resources
Commission (Spring, 1970) (unpublished research report). Note the typical case history
reflected in GAF Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2 B.N.A. Environment
Rep.—Decisions 1458 (Illinois Pollution Control Bd. 1971).
156. 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963).
157. Id. at 466.
158. Thediscretionary basis for finding bad faith for purposes offee awards would
seem to be even stronger than for purposes of punitive damage awards since the latter may
be held to incorporate a requirement of malice.
159. A reluctance to commit questionable policy positions to written or recorded
memoranda is discernible in both corporate and governmental circles, and the availability
of records in general is accordingly often restricted. Cf. 5U.S.C § 552(b)(4)-(5) (1970)
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Moreover, in the case of administrative defendants the burden
is multiplied by the broad range generally given toofficial discre
tion and presumptions of validity for administrative actions.
Where legal questions are complicated, official duties unclear, or
official conduct ambivalent, plaintiffs will ordinarily find dimin
ishing returns in trying to produce evidence of bad faith.160
As to policy, it does notseem desirable to rely upon anequity
rationale so heavily redolent ofmoral fault. Beyond the practical
and subjective problems of proving bad faith, the moral tone of
self-righteousness necessary to plead for the award of costs in
order to "punish" defendants clouds the more straightforward
argument that public interest plaintiffs deserve costs on their own
merits, quite independent of thegoodness or badness of thedefen
dants. In the same way that defendants' "fault" is increasingly
irrelevant in divorce proceedings, it is a difficult and unnecessary
importation into environmental litigation.161 This approach
misses the real point, and thus costs in some cases would not be
granted to plaintiffs who might otherwise merit them.
The obduracy rationale offers further tactical disadvantages.
The most significant is its potential for backfiring since it can
operate against any party to litigation. Defendants can often be
heard challenging the legitimacy and good faith of environmental
plaintiffs' motives.162 If their complaints can constitute grounds
for fee recovery against plaintiffs, the obduracy principle might
operate to deter rather than encourage some desirable public in
terest litigation, as well as doubling the potential for unedifying
litigation over alleged bad faith.
Since there are only a few situations covered by the obduracy
rationale that cannot be better handled by alternative theories,163
160. Cf. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
161. Besides the extra cost in time required in any "fault" inquiry, the divorce
example demonstrates that such an inquiry also imports an unnecessary element of indi
vidual bitterness into judicial proceedings.
162. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), where code-
fendant Humbolt Fir, Inc. counterclaimed for compensatory and punitive damages due
to plaintiff's disruption of a contract with a government agency to log a wilderness area.
The court held that the first amendment guarantees the right to petition a government
agency and that the Sierra Club cannot be required to compensate defendant for losses
caused by agency compliance with statutory duties.
163. The primary occasion for award offees where the common fund and private
attorney general principles do not apply would appear to be in cases where individual
damages are recovered, as in a private nuisance action, in which case the defendant's
obduracy might allow a plaintiff to make himself whole by recouping attorneys' fees.
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an approach that turns on the merits of plaintiffs' efforts seems
more practical and rational in the circumstances.
B. Common Fund
In the wake of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.m the common
fund approach has theoretically expanded in its potential appli
cation topublic interest litigation. There are, however, persuasive
arguments in most cases that judicial reliance should be placed
elsewhere. Insofar as the result of litigation is to create or defend
an existing or implied pecuniary fund, the principle may be use
ful. Where, for example, a public utility violates environmental
mandates by overcharging consumers according to a rate struc
ture that promotes wasteful use of energy, costs after successful
litigation might properly be levied against the implicit common
fund thus created.165 Damages recovered in class action and pub
lic nuisance suits may likewise constitute such common benefit
funds out of which cost recovery is eminently justified.166
Where the common benefit fund is not pecuniary, however,
(and Mills held that the common fund approach was not re
stricted topecuniary benefit funds)167 the definition of thenature,
volume and recipients of litigation benefits becomes increasingly
subjective.168 If a citizen stops an economically and environmen
tally wasteful dam project, for instance, must the common fund
label bestretched to capitalizethe public's environmental ameni
ties thereby saved? And how in theory does the stalemated dam-
building defendant draw upon such a fund in order to pay plain
tiffs' costs?169 In many such cases, even if the litigation may be
164. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
165. This is the type of fund referred to by Mr. Justice Marshall in the SCRAPcase
where he found "provision for an accounting and 'refund' to the people ofour nation for
the irreversible ecological damage that results from [an environmentally wasteful] rate
increase . . ."in the Interstate Commerce Act's requirement that carriers "maintain
detailed records of monies received due to [a rate] increase ... to compel payment of
refunds if a rate increase was ultimately found to be unreasonable." 412 U.S. at 730-31.
Similar funds may be found in electric utilities' promotional rate structures.
166. Indeed, class actions already embody the principle ofallowing recovery ofcoun
sel fees out of common fund damage recoveries. See Lindy Bros. Bldg., Inc. v. American
Radiator Standard Sanitary Corp., 42 U.S.L.W. 2249 (3d Cir. Nov. 31, 1973).
167. 396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).
168. Noted by the La Raza court, 57 F.R.D. at 96-97.
169. If the benefitted class is drawn so broadly as to include all consumers or the
general American public, then the ability of corporate defendants to pass on costs to
consumers or of the government to passon in taxeswhat it does not payout ofpork barrel
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held to have benefitted an identifiable class, the beneficiaries
may not be coterminous with the losing defendants who are asked
to pay, and the "fund" itself, if one exists, could be beyond the
defendants' reach. The utility of the common fund approach ap
pears limited to situations involving more institutionalized
classes where these failings are minimized. And even there the
recovery of costs may well be better approached by other routes.
It would seem from consideration of Mills that the primary
reason for making the semantic contortions ofthe common fund
rule is to implement the simple conclusion that plaintiffs deserve
compensation for defending a significant point of public interest.
This process is more frankly and efficiently addressed by the
third approach to nonstatutory award of litigation costs. Though
the law is more comfortable with dollarquantifications ofbenefits
and costs, a nonpecuniary public benefit deserves recognition in
equity on its own merits.
C. Private Attorney General
The private attorney general rationale produces the most
widely useful cost recovery theory for environmental cases, which
are usually well suited to that particular approach. In fact there
is not only a nascent line ofcases in the fee-shifting context, but
also an established body of case law applying the principle to
various other aspects of environmental cases. Moreover, the pri
vate attorney general theory avoids the indirection and practical
difficulties of the previously considered approaches.170
To date, the private attorney general principle in environ
mental cases has been applied primarily to the standing question
and to a lesser extent to the question of the merits and remedies
in public interest cases. In a series ofsuits challenging adminis
trative actions, the lower federal courts found that environmental
groups could be "aggrieved" under thestanding provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act and other relevant statutes by vir-
funds, allows fee payments for purposes of semantics at least tobe drawn out of a"benefit
ted class fund." Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 5B.N.A. Environment Rep.-Decisions 1891, 1893 (1st Cir. 1973). Yet, so broad
a scope' makes any distinction between the common fund and private attorney general
theories undiscernible, in which case the latter approach seems more direct.
170. The most important practical advantage is that the private attorney general
theory is not a two-edged sword since it cannot be turned in retribution against environ
mental plaintiffs.
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tue of their "special interest" in the public issues involved.171 Like
plaintiffs in civil rights and other fields,172 they then could seek
relief in court as private attorneys general, raising public issues
that often were not being adequately advanced by public
agencies.
The Supreme Court dampened the standing revolution
somewhat in 1972 in the Mineral King case173 by saying that spe
cific injury, rather than a mere special interest in the matter, was
necessary to render the organization sufficiently aggrieved to
present the question.174 Whatever the merits of the Court's stand
ing test,175 environmentalists have not been excluded from court
as a result, since in virtually every case they can allege some
specific injury to meet the standards and that injury need not be
different from that ofthe general public.176 Significantly, the Su
preme Court in Mineral King did not withdraw the environmen
tal plaintiffs' special status as private attorneys general by re
quiring more traditional tests of standing. As the Court noted,
though such plaintiffs must establish their standing to sue in
private injury terms, they are then also vested with a much
broader standing as private attorneys general to assert the rights
and interests of the general public in seeking their relief on the
171. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert,
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C Cir. 1970); Washington Dept. ofFish &Game v. FPC, 207
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert, denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Izaak Walton League ofAm v
St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
172. See note 122et seq. supra and accompanying text.
173. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
174. Id. at 739n.14 et seq. This inquiry, of course, need not be economic.Association
ofData Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
175. Injury seems a poor candidate as the major test for standing since it isonly one
ofthe factors that may characterize an adequate "case orcontroversy" under the policy
reasons underlying standing requirements. SeeK. Davis, Administrative Law § 22.07, at
431 n.12 (3d ed. 1972).This narrow focus is especially weak when one considers the limited
degree and specificity ofinjury required to establish standing. United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669, 683 et seq. (1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W.
3305 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
176. As the Supreme Court noted, public interest plaintiffs usually can find suffi
cient injury in the fact situations litigated. The Sierra Club subsequently easily estab
lished standing by alleging individual injury to itshiking members. Sierra Club v.Morton,
348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Thepractical drawbacks oftherule appear inlitigation
over, for instance, an isolated portion of arctic tundra in which no Eskimo resident is a
Sierra Club member.
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merits.177 This result parallels the situation in typical environ
mental public nuisance and public trust actions, where plaintiffs
first must establish their private standing but then can base their
case upon public rights and draw upon general public injury in
seeking injunctive remedies.178 The private attorney general ra
tionale, then, continues to have a broad base in both administra
tive and common law environmental actions on the question of
plaintiffs' standing, claims on the merits, and remedies. Although
the private attorney general theory has only recently been ex
tended to fee recoveries, as in LaRaza, its noteworthy prior devel
opment in the environmental field argues strongly for its continu
ing applicability to the specific area of fees.
1. Equity Guidelines for the Private Attorney General
The private attorney general principle today is still only a
descriptive concept rather than a fixed term of art. The concept
offers guidance to courts in handling public interest litigation,
but it lacks full articulation as a legal rule. Though a group of
plaintiffs may be recognized as private attorneys general, it isnot
clearwhat consequences necessarily follow as to fee recovery. The
court in La Raza accordingly found it advisable to review the
equities of awarding counsel fees to private attorneys general in
terms that replicated the elements of the theory itself.
The La Raza court identified several criteria179 favoring the
award of attorneys' fees, drawing upon the private attorney gen-
177. 405 U.S. at 737 n.12, citing 3K. Davis, Administrative Law § 2205.07 (1958).
178. The traditional public nuisance rule is that plaintiffs may draw upon public
rights if they first can establish special private injury different in kind from the public at
large. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 C(l) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971), though
statutes and judicial circumlocutions have diluted this requirement. Id. § 821 C(2). Note
the semantics in Karpisek v. Cather &Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 117 N.W.2d 322
(1962); Wilcox v. Henry, 77 P. 1055 (Wash. 1904). Standing in public trust actions is
unclear, sometimes seeming to require special injury, Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374 (1971), at other times seeming to grant standing as in
traditional trust law to anybeneficiary. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm., 350 Mass.
410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). Qui tarn actions, which could serve toencourage public citizen
enforcement oflegal standards, unfortunately have received rather restrictive treatment
in the courts. See Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412(N.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom., Bass Anglers v. Koppers, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971). See
also Zirkle, supra note 123.
179. 57 F.R.D. at 99. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.
1971); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
1973| ENVIRONMENTAL COUNSEL FEES 65
eral principles of the civil rights cases. Each area of concern
touched upon thedefinition of private attorneys general and their
importance to the system: Whether the suit concerns a strong
public policy, benefits a wide-spread public, in circumstances in
which private enforcement is both necessary and financially bur
densome.180 While these inquiries are not dispositive in awarding
or refusing to award fees,181 they offer important guidance to eq
uity courts, and in most environmental cases each is readily ful
filled.
2. A Strong Public Policy
Since equity will not create exceptions to established com
mon law rules for trivial reasons, the justification for judicial
waivers of the no-fee rule must be found in "overriding"182 public
policies. Analytically, it could be argued that enforcement of any
law serves public policy. Yet the private attorney general cases
in environmental law and otherareas have madeclearthat some
thing more is required, that some laws present a more compelling
case for judicial encouragement of citizen enforcement than
others.183
Environmental policy certainly possesses the stature re
quired for such exercises of discretion. The past several years
have made it abundantly clear that protection ofenvironmental
quality is a high-ranking public priority amply justifying suchjudicial encouragements as the fee-shifting decision. At every
level of government, new statutes, administrative systems and
litigation emphasize our seriousness in addressing both local and
systemic environmental problems. In the vast majority of envi
ronmental cases, therefore, there should be no question that a
strong public policy is intimately involved.184 In practice, the
method for establishing the point has been simply to cite what-
180. "The rulebriefly stated is that whenever thereisnothing in a statutoryscheme
which might be interpreted as precluding it, a 'private attorney-general' should be
awarded attorneys' fees when he haseffectuated a strong Congressional policy which has
benefited a large class of people, and where further the necessity and financial burdenof
private enforcement are such as to make the award essential." 57 F.R.D. at 98.
181. See notes 66 supra and 227 infra and accompanying texts.
182. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
183. Cf. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
184. Under the equitable principles embodied in the cases, there appears to be no
reason to apply the private attorney general rubric only to congressional enactments;
strong state policies should be equally instrumental in these cases. Cf. cases cited note
148 supra.
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ever statutes bear upon a question to indicate the presence of
active public policy.I8r'
Several points require further comment. First, a court should
not in any circumstances attempt to discount the presence of a
strong public environmental policy in the light of other counter
vailing public policies. The nature of the inquiry is whether a suit
serves to raise and explore important public policies. The ulti
mate balancing of interests is a separate question on the merits
and has no direct relevance to the social utility of commencing
litigation. Second, the required strong public policy need not be
the same policy underlying the cause of action. The suit in
Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,m for exam
ple, was based upon the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which
controlled navigational obstructions. Yet the court had no hesita
tion in acknowledging plaintiffs' status as private attorneys gen
eral for environmental policy reasons, noting that similar envi
ronmental threats were the subject of serious national concern
expressed in various statutes and regulations that had no applica
bility in the given fact situation.1" On the other hand, equity
courts must exercise their discretion in excluding the award of
costs where environmental protection policy isa purely incidental
element in the context of the case and merely serves as a tangen
tial bootstrap to recovery of costs. Such broadranging waivers of
the no-fee rule should await the occasion of reforms specifically
addressed to the particular subject matter of the lawsuit or to a
general reconsideration of the no-fee rule.
3. Public Benefit
The public benefit embodied in citizen suits goes to the very
heart of the reasons for equity's encouragement of private attor
neys general. The nature and magnitude of the benefits required
185 See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972); In Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe, Civ. No. 70-2506 (D.C.D., filed June 22, 1973), when the court merely
took judicial notice of "national policy" of environmental protection and "declared con
gressional policy" for Indian welfare. Civ. No. 70-2506 at 2. Cf. Citizens Comm. for the
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) and note 187 infra.
186. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
187. Id. at 104-05 nn.8, 9, citing the Department ofTransportation Act of 1966, 49
II S C § 1653(f) (1970); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a), 742a et
seq. (1970); Hudson River Compact, 80 Stat. 847 (1966) and Corps of Engineers regula
tions.
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to trigger the equity courts' fee-shifting discretion, however, are
not correspondingly clear.
It could be argued that a finding of strong public policy auto
matically includes a finding ofthe requisite degree ofbenefit. The
two questions are similar—the mere fact of enforcing a statute,
for instance, is probably equally insufficient to justify fee-shifting
in either case.,sx The benefit inquiry, however, goes a step further.
While the policy questions require that an important public issue
be involved, the benefit inquiry would seem torequire that citizen
suits actually serve that policy in some significant fashion—that
the results of the given litigation be publicly important in and of
themselves.1*9
There is an indication on the face of the La Raza decision
thatajudicial inquiry as to benefits might go even further, requir
ing that the actual number of beneficiaries be large. The court
there explained that it was moved by the fact that the suit "has
benefitted a large class of people."190 In light of other case law
and the dangers involved in judicial numbers games, however,
it seems reasonable to adopt the more general "public benefit"
notion to evaluate the equitable inquiry. In other environmental
cases, courts have required only that the litigation benefit be
"widespread" or result in "a significant implementation of
national policy . . . [that] enhance[s] the public interest,"191
focusing upon the service aspect of the private attorney general's
role. Attempts to quantify beneficiaries thus provide a poor
alternative to this approach, unless numbers per se represent
some special policy concern in the law, which is not evident in the
cases. The benefit question should turn on the effect of private
attorneys general, and physical numbers are only one method of
gauging that effect. To rely upon quantification as a standard
would afflict courts with the nebulous task of stipulating how
many people must be directly and/or indirectly affected by an
188. The private enforcement of some statutes—the technical record-keeping of
some regulatory act, for instance-presents very different levels of public policy and
benefits from more substantive statutory schemes. See Note, supra note 125, at 756-58.
189. For purposes ofanalogy, note the Supreme Court's discussion of''substantial
benefit" (in that case to the corporation) in Mills, 396 U.S. at 395, focusing upon the
conceptual "therapeutic" benefits of plaintiff's litigation.
190. 57 F.R.D. at 98. The court further noted that 5000 people were directly affected
and 200,000 indirectly. Id. at 100.
191. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1891, 1892 (1st Cir. 1973).
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issue, and to what degree, in order to constitute a sufficiently
large'beneficiary class. It is a task the courts would do well to
steer clear of.192 Quantification approaches to public benefit also
might tend to raise the difficult and not necessarily relevant ques
tion of the magnitude of the subject matter objectives of
litigation.19*
Net benefit is also a misleading inquiry. As in the case of
assessing social policy,194 any process of discounting public benefit
by weighing allegedly detrimental consequences against it mis
places the balancing process (which should properly take place
during the hearing on the merits) and applies it retroactively so
as to diminish the incentive for private attorneys general to de
fend the public interest.
It is far more practical and consistent with the private attor
ney general principle to assess an action's public benefit in pro
cess terms: the utilitarian importance of the private litigation as
it prompts a review of an important legal question or accom
plishes a "therapeutic" effect.195 The environmental private attor
ney general standing cases reflect this conclusion—citizens were
treated as private attorneys general to litigate over the meaning
of one small word ("dike" in the Hudson Valley Expressway
case),9fi because the case raised environmental issues with far-
192. The La Raza court itself used a broad conceptual description ofbenefits far
more abstract than its prior quantification language in finally noting that "almost all of
society is better off when public policies in these areas have been strengthened." 57 F.R.D.
at 10°- r i. • **u193. Measurement ofthe value ofany particular litigation in terms ofthesize otthe
stream being polluted or the diminutive weight of a single controverted statutory word is
absurd on its face. See, e.g., note 182 supra and accompanying text. Acase that demon
strated an important application of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act dealt
with only one roadside pile of salt. Water Resources Comm'n v. Chippewa County,Civil
No. 71-1255 (Cir. Ct. Chippewa Cty., Mich., filed May 27, 1971).
194. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
195 "[I]t is difficult to conclude that the filing of the suit did not help to ensure
that adequate precautions would be taken to protect South Texas' very valuable water
resources and that the measures taken would be made available to the scrutiny of the
public eye." Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.-Decisions 1745 1746(W.D. Tex. 1973). Cf. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94,100 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
196. The authority to construct the expressway turned upon the question whether
its landfill was a dike; the court there held that it was, and thus no construction could
proceed without specific congressional approval under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
33 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1970).
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reaching legal implications in public works cases; others were
held to have produced public benefit despite the fact that the
project they attacked eventually proceeded exactly as planned,197
or with modifications.198 Sufficient benefit depends on whether
the suit itself substantially serves a strong public policy or raises
and explores questions that are important to a wider range of
analogous cases, or whether to the contrary its effects are merely
restricted to the specific terms of a minor local situation.199
4. Necessity of Private Enforcement
The most basic utility of public interest citizen suits lies in
the pragmatic truth that for many and various reasons public
officials and agencies do not and perhaps are not capable of polic
ing the system adequately.
In many cases, governmental inadequacy in environmental
protection arises from practical physical limitations. In compari
son to polluters and other degraders ofthe environment, govern
ment enforcement agencies have severely limited resources in
time, funds, personnel and political backing. Public interest
plaintiffs can operate as allies, expanding the number of cases
that can be brought before the courts by adding their resources
to those of the established law enforcers. In recognition of this
necessary function Congress has recently begun inserting citizen
suit provisions in even the most sophisticated major pollution
control statutes, courts have expanded the common law standing
rules, and numerous states have enacted citizen standing statutes
to permit enforcement of environmental standards.200
NEPA's evolution emphasizes the point. "As in the civil
rights area," the Sierra Club v. Lynn court wrote, "the burden of
197. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745 (W.D. Texas
198. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir
1971), noting the improvements made during the course of litigation. The same arguments
could be made by plaintiffs in the Alaska Pipeline case for prompting research, disclosure
and major engineering safeguards against oil spills and other ecological damage that would
not have been added to the project but for the pressure of court suits against the inade
quate environmental impact statement originally prepared. Sierra Club v Hickel 433
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
199. Most individual private nuisance suits, for example, would fail to embody
sufficiently broad public benefits, even though they might be colorably "environmental "
since they would merely apply a familiar rule oflaw to their particular local facts.
200. Cf. note 4 supra.
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complying with the national environmental policy, as expressed
by Congress through the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ... has fallen upon concerned citizens."201 The CEQ, which
can only spot check the majority of environmental impact state
ments since it has a staff of less than twenty to review hundreds
of statements each year, publishes the 102 Monitor on its own
initiative as a pragmatic attempt to enlist public involvement in
federal environmental reviews.202 The practice is a dramatic
indication that even well-intentioned government agencies lack
adequate resources and sanctions to do their job, requiring the
support of citizen plaintiffs as in the present situation and more.
In other situations, official inadequacy in enforcing environ
mental mandates can only be explained in more disingenuous
terms: the agency is not energetic in prosecuting violations or fails
to act altogether because of political pressure, alignment with the
special interests it was intended to regulate, or because the
agency is itself promoting the activity that threatens the environ
ment 2o:i In such cases public interest plaintiffs are less likely to
be greeted as allies, but the necessity for their intervention is even
greater. Without them, enforcement actions might not be brought
at all. The courts, applying the private attorney general principle,
have recognized the governmental necessity for private litigation
as a policy basis for encouraging public interest citizen suits.
Where
[t]he only public entities that might have brought suit . . .[are] named as defendants ... and vigorously [oppose]
plaintiffs' contentions, . . . only private citizens can be ex
pected to guard the guardians.204
In regard to the Federal Air Pollution Act's enforcement one court
noted that
[t]he "regrettably slow" progress in controlling air pollution is
blamed on [both] a scarcity of skilled personnel available to
enforce control measures and on a lack of aggressiveness by
EPA's predecessor agency. . . . The public suit seems particu-
201. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1746.
202 Council on Environmental Quality, 102 Monitor.
203. Cf. J. Goulden, The Superlawyers 39-42, 146, 180-224 (1971).
204. 57 F.R.D. at 101. .
205. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1891, 1892 (1st Cir. 1973).
1973| ENVIRONMENTAL COUNSEL FEES 71
larly instrumental in the statutory scheme [in cases forcing
agency compliance] for only the public—certainly not the pol
luter—has the incentive to complain if the EPA falls short
2(15
The necessity rationale, however, may be applied in ways that
hamper its usefulness. A court, for instance, might require more
than evidence that there is a need for enforcement litigation in a
given field. It could require instead that to prove necessity in a
particular case, plaintiffs must prove that no officials would have
prosecuted that specific question. Such reasoning could draw
upon the rationale of statutes which restrict private enforcement
to cases where officials are not "diligently prosecuting'' environ
mental violations.206
This approach is inadvisable on both policy and technical
legal grounds. Thenumber ofcases potentially requiring enforce
ment is sogreat that there are more than enough for everyone who
wants to prosecute. The speculative argument that an agency
might well have prosecuted an action on its own fails to recognize
the benefits of voluntary citizens' efforts in freeing agency re
sources for other situations meriting enforcement.207 Determina
tion of necessity in isolated case-by-case terms that ignore the
overall need for enforcement efforts misses the point of the pri
vate attorney general policy.
The inquiry isalso mistaken in more technical terms. Inspec
tion of the specific need for private enforcement in each case, in
terms of lack of diligent prosecution or whatever, is preempted
long before the question of fee recovery is raised. Such defenses
are raised, argued and disposed ofat the initial stages oflitigation
in the standing and primary jurisdiction reviewability inquiries.
If a court has overruled them to reach the merits, that ruling
should be persuasive as to necessity at the later stageofdetermin
ing cost recovery.
5. Financial Burden of Private Enforcement
Limitation on financial resources can place tremendous stra-
206. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 304(b)(1)(B), 42 U S C
§ 1857h-2(b)(l)(B) (1970).
207. One of the ironies of administrative enforcement is that the agencies that
argue most strenuously (on primary jurisdiction grounds) against allowing citizen enforce
ment suits, regularly pose the excuse of insufficient resources and manpower to explain
their own laxity in prosecution.
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tegic constraints upon public interest plaintiffs. The courts have
raised the issue, but have not required proof of severe financial
burden as an element of the private attorney general approach.
Nevertheless, in most cases, environmental plaintiffs can make
a showing of financial necessity that provides a strong additional
argument for fee awards.
Money is often the determining factor in sustaining public
interest litigation. An illustration of its importance can be found
again in the litigation history of NEPA's section 102. Federal
agencies produce about one thousand impact statements an
nually, and recent studies have indicated that a large percentage
of these fail to satisfy statutory requirements.208 Yet the public
has been able to prosecute NEPA litigation in response to only
a small number of inadequate impact statements, averaging ap
proximately 30 per year.209 Part of the explanation of the limited
number of NEPA challenges may lie in the fact that many projects are substantively commendable notwithstanding flaws in
their procedural compliance with section 102, and therefore do
not attract private enforcers. But the cases that do reach court
result in such large bills that they strongly indicate that fee bur
dens must present forceful deterrents against commencing litiga
tion even where the facts richly merit judicial review. NEPA
cases, though generally turning on comparatively straightforward
procedural questions and rarely involving the complex factfind
ing and statistical analysis common in corporate litigation, never
theless routinely absorb a thousand hours of attorneys' time in
pretrial hearings and trial on the merits.210 Ifpreliminary injunc-
208. Council onEnvironmental Quality, Fourth Annual Report of TheCouncil
on Environmental Quality 244-246; Comptroller General ofthe United States, Ade
quacy of Selected Environmental Impact Statements Prepared Under the National
Environmental Policy Actof 1969, Rep. No. B-170186 to the Subcomm. onFisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. onMerchant Marine and Fisheries (1972).
The GAO found none of the sampled EIS's fully adequate under NEPA.
209. A review of the NEPA cases reported in 3 B.N.A. Environmental Reporter
reveals, for instance, approximately 40 district court decisions ina twelve month period
in 1971-72. Thedisproportionate difference between the small number ofstatements ac
tually challenged and the number potentially challengeable emphasizes the necessity for
private enforcement, and even more so when it is noted that a number of NEPA cases
each year are brought against projects outside the annual EIS total, for projects where no
impact statement was prepared.
210. Telephone interview with member of Environmental Defense Fund legal staff,
November 16, 1973. See also Tennessee Citizens for Wilderness Planning Newsletter,
October 29, 1973, at 2-3.
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tions appear necessary—as they do in large numbers of federal
projects where impending actions threaten irretrievable commit
ments of resources211—the potential counsel time swells propor
tionately. These prospects do noteven consider the time involved
in appeals which are substantially certain to follow a successful
trial.212
Unlike plaintiffs in some classes of environmental tort ac
tions,21* NEPA plaintiffs have no opportunity for damage re
coveries and are in most cases not litigating to preserve any
income-generating resource.214 Nor, unlike government and corpo
rate litigants, are their expenses borne as normal incidents of a
tax-funded or profit-making enterprise. Thus, every dollar con
tributed to the defense of the public interest is a philanthropic
expenditure, often spent merely to maintain nature's non-profit
status quo.215 Under such circumstances, there is little wonder
that potential litigants do not freely undertake public interest
NEPA actions and other environmental litigation216 whenever the
211. In one recent case, the expense and logistical burden of presenting motions and
arguments for a preliminary injunction were so great that the opportunity tohaltconstruc
tion was lost; the pouring of concrete for a dam was commenced and completed between
the time of filing and time ofhearing of the NEPA complaint. In such situations it is
doubtful that NEPA can be applied by citizen plaintiffs so astoassure rational decision
making. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, Civil No. 1130 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (Duck
River Normandy Dam). Telephone interview with member of Environmental Defense
Fund staff, November 16, 1973.
212. Approximately one-half ofthe NEPA decisions noted annually in the B.N.A
Environmental Reporter are appealed.
213. Unless, of course, a NEPA claim is incorporated with other claims posing the
potential for damage recovery.
214. Theexceptions, like one ofthe plaintiffs in the Tongass Forest case who was a
backwoods guide, Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971), are usually
the result of building arguments for standing. Such exceptions are so insignificant in
magnitude as not to constitute a bar to the financial burden argument.
215. In light of the booming use of wilderness resources by citizens from a broad
range ofsociety, theold argument that environmentalists area small well-to-do elite who
can afford litigaton falls flat. On theother hand, thefact ofbroad environmental use does
not imply that environmentalists should be able to compete in the litigation marketplace.
Popular use of the environment is generally not taxable or chargeable in money terms
while the development-construction forces are supported directly through the economic
system, an unequal confrontation wherever it arises.
216. A recent Michigan case attempting to forestall a developer's damming and
diversion of a small stream via the state environmental protection statute consumed
$15,000 with no financial benefit to plaintiffs; a challenge against a wetlands subdivision
consumed $45,000. Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources, 71-13859-C (Cir Ct
Ingram City, Mich., Dec. 8, 1971); Irish v. Green, 4B.N.A. Environment Rep.-Decisions
1402 (Ingram City, Mich., April 12, 1972). Letter from John H. Tanton to Zyg Plater
August 31, 1973, on file in the Tennessee Law Review office.
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public interest requires.
The financial burden inquiry, however, should not require
that plaintiffs would be rendered destitute in the absence of fee
recovery. Such a test would far exceed the requirements of the
private attorney general rationale. Rather, the question is
whether by the absence of fee recovery in one case the plaintiffs
or groups like them would be discouraged from bringing similar
actions in the future. This approach follows from the reasoning
in Mills, Hall, Lee, and othercivil rights cases that suchlitigants
should not be burdened with expense, "in order to encourage suits
that so clearly enhance the public interest."217 The main function
of the private attorney general financial burden inquiry, then,
may be to exclude fee-shifting in the situations noted above where
plaintiffs' commercial interests in profit-generating elements of
the case would induce them to litigate the public question with
or without a potential fee recovery.218 Where the fact situation
does not provide positive and unmistakable economic incentives
for the plaintiff, the financial burden element of equity's private
attorney general fee-shifting theory would seem to be fulfilled.
In the minds, however, of many polluters, bureaucrats, re
porters and politicians, and in popular mythology, environmental
plaintiffs often appear tobe a part of a monolithic force perfectly
capable of financing and prosecuting actions on a sufficiently
broad scale to threaten all forms of national progress. From this
perspective, environmental litigants do not need any financial
encouragement to litigate. Indeed they could use some active
disincentive. Besides ignoring the very real value of environmen
tal litigation, such arguments fail to appreciate the extremely
small number of environmental cases filed annually in relation to
the volume of continuing pollution and environmental degrada
tion. The significant impact ofenvironmental litigation is a trib
ute to the judicious litigation choices made by environmental
groups. Cases have been targeted where they will have the most
substantial impact, making strategic points of law or findings of
fact with maximum multiplier effects.219
217. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed June
22, 1973), citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
218.' Neither the obduracy nor common fund approaches, however, would necessar
ily be excluded in that situation. The equitable considerations involved in applying the
private attorney general theory to cases involving damage recoveries will inevitably vary
according tothe circumstances of each case. Suffice it tonote thatfee awards are not ipso
facto precluded, since plaintiff's ability to pay fees has been held no bar inother cases,
including contingent fee cases. Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971).
219. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
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Major environmental litigation today relies upon the efforts
of three large national groups—the Environmental Defense Fund,
the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources Defense Council220
—which have developed substantial litigation budgets through
the support of private citizens and foundations. The equity
arguments for fee recovery, however, are not rendered inappli
cable by the presence of such economic support for litigation.
These relatively modest funds221 are often a sine qua non for
public interest suits; they permit citizens to undertake public
interest litigation that otherwise would never occur, particularly
if it involves appellate review.
Absent foundation funding, it is simply not economically ra
tional for any single individual or small group ... to attempt
to capture their minute portion of aggregate good [in environ
mental preservation] by incurring large expense to enforce a
widely held right.222
The equity theory recognizes that fee-shifting facilitates such
important litigation and need not be deterred by the tax-exempt
nature of the plaintiff. As the First Circuit noted in regard to a
statutory fee-shifting case, "if [the theory for] award of fees [is
to] encourage meritorious litigation ... the identity of the
party, and the source of its counsel, would be of little moment."223
And, as the La Raza court further noted:
220. The three, between them, account for approximately 15 percent of the first
named plaintiffs in NEPA cases reported in the most recent B.N.A. Environmental Re
porter Indices.
221. Whereas a large corporation can easily spend a million and a half dollars ina
single antitrust suit, the three organizatons combined have litigation budgets less than
that to cover all legal actions in the hundreds of projects and environmental problems that
arise nationwide each year. Interviews with representatives of environmental groups' legal
staffs in Knoxville, Tennessee, November21, 1973.
222. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972), citing M. Olson
Jr.,The Logic ofCollective Action, Public Goods and theTheory ofGroups (Harvard
Econ. Series #124, 1965).
223. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
5B.N.A. Environment Rep.-Decisions 1891, 1895 n.7 (1st Cir. 1973), where the defen
dant had argued that tax exempt plaintiff groups formed for the purpose of litigating
should be barred from recovery. In rejecting the defense, the court cited La Raza Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539-39 n.14 (5th Cir. 1970) and Woolfolk
v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 536 (E.D. Va. 1973). The reasoning would seem to apply
equally well to plaintiffs funded by government grants. Any inherent conflicts ofinterest
would be disposed of in the initial stages of litigation. Government funded budgets are as
fixed as private foundation budgets, and both groups can serve the public interest equally
well through litigation of the same nature.
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The fact that [plaintiffs' attorneys] . . . receive tax-exempt
foundation money is not germain [sic] to their status as private
attorneys-general .... We cannot presume that Congress in
tended to rely on tax-exempt foundations tofund costs oflitiga
tion in order to effectuate its policies, northat suchfunding will
continue in the future . . . .224
Finally, it appears that the element of financial burden is a
less important part of the necessity inquiry in cases in which
plaintiffs otherwise establish their status as private attorneys
general, at least in the absence of any profit incentive in the
litigation. Even the La Raza court, which spent several para
graphs discussing the financial burden element as a function of
the private attorney general principle, eventually ignored the
question in its holding.225 Sierra Club v. Lynn, the San Antonio
Ranch case, focused upon the virtues of private effectuation of
strong public policy to the complete exclusion of the financial
226inquiry.
In most environmental cases, plaintiffs' lack of a financial
incentive to bring litigation will constitute sufficient grounds to
convince equity courts to encourage such suits through fee-
shifting. In any event, the focus of judicial emphasis on other
considerations argues against constructing a narrower or stricter
standard with respect to the financial statusof theenvironmental
plaintiff.
6. General Equitable Considerations
If any lesson can be drawn from the cases, it is that courts
sitting in equity dislike being tied down to a fixed set of disposi
tive rules. As the Sierra Club v. Lynn court said of the three well
established exceptions to the American rule:
This Court is in disagreement with such a hard and fast ap-
224. La RazaUnida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1972), citingMiller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Contra, Gaddis v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
225. Given ... the presence of the three factors ... 1) the effectuation
ofstrongpublic policies; 2) the fact that numerous people received benefits . . .
3) the fact that only a private party could have been expected to bring this
action—this court believes that it must . . . award attorneys' fees ....
57 F.R.D. at 101.
226. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1745-46.
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proach .... A slight deviation from one of the established
elements of any of the exceptions would [not] ipso facto de
prive the plaintiffs ofan award should the trial courtdecide that
equity dictates the award.227
The court then followed its own advice and awarded fees even
though the judgment on the merits had "clearly and unequivo
cally" denied all of plaintiffs' requested relief. It did so in broad
private attorney general terms, stating that "a very important
service has been performed in creating a greater public awareness
of the dangers of pollution threatening [a] very valuable natural
resource."228
Apart from its implications for the degree oflitigious success
required for fee-shifting,229 Sierra Club v. Lynn emphasizes the
flexibility of an equity court's considerations in fashioning orders
to meet the requirements of a litigation situation. It is in that
light that the elements of the private attorney general principle
detailed in La Raza should be characterized as variable factors
favoring the award offees rather than as the dispositive standards
of a fixed rule.230 At least until a more substantial case law is
developed, the factors motivating equity courts in this area will
undoubtedly continue to be that flexible.
IV. Limitations to Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation
A. The Judicial Standard
Just as the private attorney general doctrine represents one
expression of the inadequacy of a no-fee rule, so too are some of
the common tests that guide the courts in the traditional no-fee
context ill-suited in the private attorney general cases. It is often
stated as the black letter rule in the United States that if the
courts are empowered to and choose to award costs (which may
include counsel fees) those costs should go to the "prevailing"
party.231 Generally, the prevailing party is one who succeeds in
that court inobtaining a judgment in his favor against theoppos
ing party. Thus, where a taxpayer, for example, wins some pre-
227. Id. at 1745 (emphasis added).
228. Id., quoting from the court's previous judgment andorder ofMay 21, 1973.
229. See notes 244-46 infra and accompanying texts.
230. Seealso Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
231. 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at If 54.70[4], at 1310.
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liminary victories against the government but ultimately suffers
a final judgment against him, the court may award costs to the
United States,2112 regarding it as a prevailing party.
The notion of "prevailing party," however, must be quali
fied First, the prevailing party requirement is nearly always a
creature of statutory origin;233 it is not a controlling principle in
the absence of a statutory mandate or other specific rule. Profes
sor Moore has observed:
[A]part from an express provision in a statute or rule, the
allowance of costs to the prevailing party is not an inexorable
principle and the court in its discretion can direct otherwise,[and] when the court exercises its discretion the identification
of the prevailing party may become so unimportant as to be
almost immaterial.234
Second, once the court determines that one party satisfies the
standard of meritoriousness to permit the court's consideration of
fee-shifting, then it must decide to what extent fee-shifting is
indicated. ...
This two-step analysis is well illustrated in Ledge Hill
Farms, Inc. v. W.R. Grace and Co.,23" an antitrust action. There
the court recognized that it could be assumed, based on the jury
verdict, that defendant had committed an antitrust violation but
that it did not proximately cause damage to plaintiff. The court
awarded costs to defendant, which was legally the prevailing
party (as required by statute in this instance), but in exercising
its discretion limited those costs, initially taxed at $3,607.96, to
a $20 docket fee.
These two facets, "meritoriousness" and "equitable discre
tion" of the equitable exceptions, are considered below.
1. Meritoriousness
Although the "prevailing party" standard is the common
threshold test for invoking the court's discretion in fee-shifting
based upon statutory authorization, other less rigorous tests have
been employed in the equitable exceptions. In Kahan v.
232 See Stroller v. United States, 444 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1971).
233. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d); au
thorities cited notes 56-57 supra.
234. 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at f 54.70[4], at 1310.
235. 230F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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Rosenstiel,m which relied on both the common fund and obdur
ate behavior approaches, the court simply required that plain
tiff's action be "meritorious."237 Meritoriousness, the court recog
nized, had often been equated with the ability ofplaintiff's case
to withstand a motion to dismiss.238 Yet, by not expressly adopt
ing that test, the court in Kahan implied an even more flexible
analysis which not only recognized a departure from the strict
prevailing party concept, but also, where warranted, from notions
focusing exclusively upon the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit.
Thus, counsel fees may be awarded where a case becomes moot,239
as in Kahan\ where it is settled;240 where no complaint was ever
filed;241 and even where a judgment was ultimately entered
against plaintiff on the merits.242 Even in Mills fees were awarded
at an intermediate stage despite the fact that "the question of
relief had to await further proceedings.243
Both the "prevailing party" and the "meritoriousness" tests
are result-oriented. The difference is that the former looks to the
end result while the latter focuses upon the therapeutic result of
the various facets of the litigation both in terms of the instant
case and beyond. Because of its fixed end result focus, the "pre
vailing party" test is singularly unsuited as a standard for deter-
236. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970). The factual background of the Kahan case is
discussed in the text accompanying note 92 supra.
237. 424 F.2dat 167. Thecourtheldthat it was not necessarily a condition precedent
to recovery of attorneys' fees that "suit be brought to successful completion since such a
requirement might discourage prompt settlement." Id. See, e.g., Levine v. Bradlee, 378
F.2d620 (3d Cir. 1967); Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
238. Id.; see, e.g., ChryslerCorp. v. Dann, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A.2d 384 (1966). It
would appear that the test enunciated in Dann suggests the requirement fora reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the merits.
239. See, e.g., Pegues v. Bakane, 445 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971) (dicta in fair
housing discrimination case); Globus, Inc.v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp.807, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(shareholder's derivative action).
240. See, e.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 325, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 153 (1st Dist. 1968).
241. See, e.g., Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
242. In McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451F.2d 1109(1st Cir. 1971), a nontenured teacher
challenged the nonrenewal of his teaching contract. The college prevailed on the merits,
but plaintiff still was awarded fees because he was forced to invoke the judicial process
in order to obtain an explanationforhis nonrenewal. The focus for the purposes ofcounsel
fees was not the final judgment, but the results achieved, which from the plaintiff's
standpoint and others similarly situated were significant despite the fact that he ulti
mately lost the case.See Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 455 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972); Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970).
243. 396 U.S. at 389.
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mining when a court might, if it chooses, exercise its equitable
discretion to award attorneys' fees.
The Kahan rationale has been followed in at least two recent
notable environmental cases applying the private attorney gen
eral rule. In Sierra Club v. Lynn,244 plaintiffs were denied all the
relief they sought. Yet the litigation did result in an order by the
court holding the case in abeyance pending, inter alia, the filing
by HUD of a satisfactory Environmental Impact Statement,
which, along with other reports, was thereafter forthcoming.
Under such circumstances, the district court granted counsel
fees, stating:
Essentially, the plaintiffs forced heretofore untested hypotheses
to be subjected to rigorous study which did in fact reveal the
project to be safe, forcing ... the government . . . to do what
[it] . . . should have done of their own initiative in the first
place .... Prior to the filing of the lawsuit there was no firm
assurance that all of the studies eventually done would be done
. Thus even if the judgment in the above entitled case were
read as totally unfavorable to the plaintiffs, and resulting in
none of the relief which they originally sought, it would still
remain within the inherent equitable power of the Court to
award attorneys' fees if so prompted by "overriding considera
tions" indicating the need for such a recovery.245
A similar approach was adopted in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,24" where the
244. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
245. Id. at 1747-48 (citations omitted).
246. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep—Decisions 1891 (3d Cir. 1973) where the court
observed:
We are not impressed by the government's argument that because some issues
weredecided adverselyto petitioners each party should bear its owncosts ....
We are at liberty to consider not merely "who won" but what benefits were
conferred. The purpose ofan award ofcosts and fees is not mainly punitive. It
is to allocate the costs of litigation equitably, to encourage the achievement of
statutory goals .... It is our impression, overall, that petitioners, in their
watchdog role, have performed a service. . . .
[T]he challenges here, even those not sustained, were mainly constructive and
reasonable. And petitioners were successful in several major respects; they
should notbe penalized for having also advanced some points oflesser weight.
Id. at 1895-96. Contrast Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C,
filed June 22, 1973). In the Paiute case, because plaintiff was unsuccessful in some ofits
opening procedural moves (such as an abortive attempt at joinder), the court discounted
otherwise reimbursable time expended by plaintiff's counsel in those unfruitful efforts.
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court ignored the fact that some issues had been decided against
petitioners.
Thus in Lynn, meritoriousness referred not to plaintiff's ulti
mate success in obtaining the sought-after relief or in prevailing
on every issue but rather to certain positive results derived from
plaintiff's efforts in the litigation. And those results, though not
amounting to victories on the merits, nevertheless suggested that
but for plaintiff's intervention, conduct in derogation of the sta
tutory scheme would havegone unchecked and the required envi
ronmental impact statements and other statutory requirements
would probably not have been satisfied. This flexible notion of
meritoriousness recognizes that the congressional purpose is
equally well served where an acceptable public project moves
forward after forced compliance with the minimum statutory
safeguards, as where an unsound project is stopped. Where either
result is a productofan exercise ofthe legal process, the requisite
degree of success on the merits has been demonstrated.
The meritoriousness inquiry is a threshold proposition. The
court asks whether plaintiffs did "well enough" in showing what
defendants did wrong or should not have done at all. Yet, the test
is not a "bad faith" one, for plaintiffs' success in showing a failure
by defendants is evaluated not simply in terms of the culpability
of the defendant, but according to the plaintiffs' effectiveness in
employing the legal process to force defendant's compliance with
the statutory norm.
Once plaintiffs have established sufficient results—the re
quired degree of meritoriousness for their litigation to render
them eligible for the award of counsel fees—the court must then
turn to the more basic equitable considerations. The application
of those equitable considerations is discussed below.
2. Application of Equitable Principles
In deciding under what circumstances to award fees, equity
courts must balance between two dangers. On one hand, lavish
fee-shifting may encourage a court-clogging deluge of lawsuits.
On the other, severe restriction of fee recoveries will eliminate the
Although the Paiute case follows Kahan initsdeparture from a narrow "prevailing party"
test, it seems, in its strict measurement ofthe merits ofeach aspect ofthe litigation, to
fall short ofthe flexible view ofmeritoriousness so prominent inLynn and NRDC v. EPA,
and so essential to the application of the equitable rules.
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public benefits which underlay equity's development of excep
tions to the no-fee rule in the first place. The fear of opening
floodgates is especially relevant today in light of public distrust
of lawyers' efforts to protect or promote fee-generating litigation,
and the allegation could be made that the environment is aspiring
to be the new arena for litigation displaced by no-fault insurance
bills. .
The deluge argument raises serious questions on the advisa
bility of fee-shifting and can best be approached through an envi
ronmental analogy. The fear of a flood of litigation was commonly
raised in opposition to the statutory and judicial liberalizations
of the standing requirements for environmental actions that oc
curred in the late 1960's and thereafter. In practice, however,
although in absolute number environmental cases have indeed
increased dramatically, the relative growth ofthe courts' environ
mental case load has not.247 As far as frivolous suits are concer-
ened, the courts appear quite capable of weeding them out, and
the burdens oflitigation remain such that attorneys arereluctant
to sue unless they are likely to prevail.
As to meritorious claims, there is, of course, serious question
whether practical burdens alone should bar cases thatare merito
rious and well-suited to judicial resolution. In any event, the
practical burdens on courts have not proved so oppressive in part
because the burdens on plaintiffs remain heavy. Even if fee-
shifting were the rule rather than the exception in environmental
litigation, the tendency of courts, while becoming more flexible,
to restrict fee recoveries to prevailing parties, and the complex
novelty of most environmental cases, combine to ensure that en
vironmental suits will remain an uncertain gamble. Where plain
tiffs' burdens do not produce adequate self-policing, the private
attorney general criteria give courts ample opportunity to adjust
awards discriminatingly to the merits ofeach plaintiff and each
case.
The equitable considerations which should guide courts in
regard to fee awards in specific cases flow straightforwardly from
the principles already discussed in Part III. Their application in
247 For an in depth analysis of this phenomenon within one particular jurisdiction
see Sax &Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: AProgress Report
70 Mich. L.Rev. 1004 (1972). Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1966).
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the first two instances (the obduracy and common fund excep
tions) is indicated bycriteria that are relatively familiar to equity
courts—bad faith standards in the former and common bene
fit/unjust enrichment principles in the latter.248 Guidelines on the
specific application of the private attorney general theory are
slightly more complicated. Some courts have gone so far as to say
that once plaintiffs have fulfilled whatever criteria the court
deems necessary to constitute private attorneys general, "attor
neys' fees should be awarded unless the trial court can articulate
specific reasons for a denial"24* In reality, of course, no exercise
of equitable discretion can, by definition, be mandatoryupon an
equitycourt. The cases citedshould insteadstand for the proposi
tion that when a private attorney general substantially serves the
public interest through environmental litigation, there is a very
compelling case for equitable waiver of the no-fee rule, since sig
nificant public interests would be frustrated by a denial of fee
recovery.
Further arguments might be posed, as noted above,250 that
tax-exempt foundation-funded plaintiffs be barred from fee-
recovery, but in practice this argument has operated, if at all, to
limit the amount of recovery.251 "The award of attorneys' fees is
not [necessarily] intended to make plaintiffs or their attorneys
248. See notes 76, 88 et seq. supra and accompanying texts.
249. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5 N.B.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745, 1746 (W.D.
Tex. 1973) (emphasis added), citing Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 296
(5th Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972), where the court stated: "Indeed, under such
circumstances, the award loses much of its discretionary character . . ." (emphasis
added). Cf. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
250. See note 223 supra and accompanying text.
251. See cases cited at note 223 supra. Highly varying figures for fee awards have
been suggested, including for example: that oftheCriminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006
A(d) (1970), ($30 anhour incourt, $20 for outofcourt time); Sierra Club v.Lynn, 5B.N.A.
Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1748, (a "bedrock minimum" of $30 an hour);'see Pyra
mid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed June 22, 1973); anda
$12.82 perhour ceiling on any private attorney general fee awards in the pending case of
Harrisburg CARE v.Volpe, Civil No. 71-143 (M.D. Pa. 1973), based ona pro rata calcula
tionofthe hourly wages of the State ofPennsylvania's Attorney General (Brief for Defen
dant inOpposition toPlaintiffs' Motion for Award ofFees and Costs at 30, undated). Cf.
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Reasonable Attorneys' Fees, TOOR v.
HUD, Civil No. 69-324 SAW (N.D. Cal. 1973), where plaintiffs argue at length for award
of$100 an hour in light ofan extensive listofapplicable criteria. Id. at 24 etseq. See also
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-18, DR 2-106 (1972).
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whole;"252 the fee-recovery theories (and most particularly the
private attorney general theory) are calculated to reward and
encourage public interest plaintiffs, but this does not necessarily
mean full compensation for services. As in other areas of fee liti
gation, reasonableness in the light of all circumstances appears
to be the standard for environmental fee awards,253 and in private
attorney general litigation the plaintiffs' voluntary public service
nature may be considered part of the circumstances. As Judge
Gesell noted in awarding $30.00 an hour to plaintiffs' attorneys
in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe,
[t]his charge ... is at the very bottom of the scale but the
nature of the case and the circumstances under which the law
yers undertook thework justify thecourt infixing thefees at this
bedrock minimum.254
In other areas of the law, courts are currently tending to
grant fee-shifting awards which more truly compensate lawyers
for the time they spend at fair hourly rates,255 and this tendency
will probably extend to environmental litigation as the case law
increases. Although the litigation is pro bono publico, it is
increasingly obvious that environmental cases often require the
serious full time efforts of organized plaintiff groups that spare
time lawyering cannot provide. To require such plaintiffs to vol
unteer their efforts to a greater or lesser degree will to that same
extent frustrate the public purpose that equity attempts to en
courage. The major constraintuponawards calculatedto encour
age public interest suits should rather be more universal equita
ble reasonableness principles. The Natural Resources Defense
Counsel v. Environmental Protection Agency court noted, in re
gard to recovery ofcosts against a government agency, that since
the self-appointed guardians of the public interest "are not a
public agency and are legally responsible to no one but them
selves ... we must satisfy ourselves that the taxpayers' money
252. SierraClub v. Lynn, 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1745, 1748 (W.D.
Tex. 1973).
253. Cf. 1 M. Speiser, supra note 15, at § 8.1 et seq. (1972).
254. Civil No. 70-2506 at 5. It is interesting to note that the court apparently did
not correspondingly deflate the fees claimed by expert witnesses in the case.
255. Derfner, Attorneys' Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases 4 (Lawyer's Comm. for
Civil Rights Multilith, Aug. 7, 1972). Cf. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 42 U.S.L.W. 2249 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 1973).
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will not be used to support needless or excessive legal items."256
The traditional rule ofreason has much to commend it as a gen
eral controlling principle.
B. Government Defendants
Even though in most cases the doctrine of sovereign immun
ity has long since been circumvented as a ban to environmental
litigation,257 it may continue to pose obstacles to fee recoveries.
1. Federal Officials
As a general proposition, the federal government cannot be
sued without its consent.258 This rule has been held applicable to
costs against the United States.259 Notwithstanding this seem
ingly intractable bar to governmental liability (some might say
"responsibility"),260 litigants have devised and the courts tacitly
consented to a practice ofcircumventing the bar through the legal
fiction that suits are against individual officials who were acting
beyond the scope of their authority261 or unconstitutionally or
pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.262
256. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions at 1896. The court continued, saying
"|a|s attorneys for involuntary clients, their fees may properly be less than those [in]
the marketplace . . . ." Id. See notes 261, 262 infra and accompanying texts.
257. See 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27.04 et seq. (1971); Note,
supra note 140, at 1246.
258. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); United States v. Sher
wood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (dictum);
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1868); Hill v. United States, 50 U.s!
(9 Hav.) 189, 190 (1850). 91 C.J-.S. United States § 176 nn. 48&49 (1955) and cases cited
therein. It has been observed that the decisional patterns followed moreor less the same
course for actionsagainst both state and federal governments. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action 215 (1965).
259. See United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926); Pine River
Logging & Improvement Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 296 (1902).
260. The doctrine of sovereign immunity and the governmental irresponsibility
which it represents have come under increasing attack by commentators in recent years.
See 3 K. Davis supra note 257, at §§ 27.01-.10 (1958), §§ 27.00-.10 (Supp. 1970); L.Jaffe,
supra note 258, at 229 (1965); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Non-statutory" Judi
cial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1479 (1962); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrativeAction: The Need
for Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich
L. Rev. 389 (1970).
261. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Joint
Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Philadelphia Co. v. Stim-
son, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
262. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
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One would reasonably assume that if the immunity barrier
were rendered inoperable by suing the official, the path would
open for the award of attorneys' fees against the government if
otherwise justified. The courts, however, have in the last few
years adopted a number of principles that resurrect the old bar
riers. While the courts seem perfectly willing to permit certain
governmental officials to be enjoined, where federal property or
contractual and monetary interests are directly at stake263 or
where the economic pressures associated with the pending gov
ernment activity are substantial, they will not allow the govern
ment to be "stopped in its tracks."264 Thus, while some injunc
tions against government officials are permitted, others are de
nied where the "relief requested cannot be granted by merely
ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will re
quire affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of
unquestionably sovereign property."265 Some opinions have enun
ciated the even more ambivalent test ofdetermining whether the
decree against the officer would "operate" against the sov
ereign.266
The recovery of damages against governmental officials is
shrouded with further obstacles. Where officials must exercise
their discretion and they act within the scope of their authority,
they have been held to be immune from actions for damages to
assure their freedom "to exercise their duties unembarrassed by
the fear of damage suits."267
The net result from the fee-shifting standpoint has been to
bar the award of costs against federal officers in the absence of
statutory authorization.268 Thus, under the legal fiction of indi
vidual suits, the courts allow the injunction but not the costs or
attorneys' fees, never apparently acknowledging the incon-
123 (1908).
263. See 3 K. Davis, supra note 257, at § 27.05 at 565 (1958), relying on Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
264 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949),
quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet). 610, 613 (1840). For an excellent analysis
of the significance and meaning of the Larson case see Cramton, supra note 260, at 400-
11.
265. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11.
266. Hawaii v Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
267. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959); see 3 K. Davis, supra note 257, at
§ 26.01 et seq.
268. See 6 J. Moobe, supra note 16, at H 54.75[5], at 1560-61.
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sistency of such an approach. As apractical matter, by excluding
the costs and fees the court discourages future injunction actions
ab initio by its onerous refusal to award counsel fees. Certainly,
once jurisdiction over the federal government is firmly lodged in
the district court, there is no rule of equity that prevents the
award of counsel fees. On the contrary, as Justice Harlan recently
observed, once jurisdiction is vested in the court, "the scope of
equitable remedial discretion is to be determined according to the
distinctive historical tradition of equity as an institution."269
The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not normally bar
environmental actions against federal officials on the merits, a
fact to which the growing line ofenvironmental cases attests. The
inequity of recognizing a litigant's right to sue on the one hand
but depriving him of otherwise available financial implements
with which to vindicate that right, on the other, is patent. This
point was clearly made in Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.
v. Environmental Protection Agency,™ where the court held that
sovereign immunitywas no bar to the awardofcounsel fees where
there was a statute authorizing the award of counsel fees against
any party and granting a citizen the right to commence a suit
against the agency.271 It cannot be argued credibly that a different
result is required where jurisdiction is based on something less
than an express rather than implied statutory invitation to pri
vate citizens to sue and where the right to counsel fees rests on
an equitable principle rather than a statutory prescription.
269. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392 395-96 (1946)-
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1939). Justice Harlan also asked
rhetorically was not "a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress
adequate to empower afederal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subject matter
jurisdiction enumerated therein . . . ." 403 U.S. at 405.
270. 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1391, 1393 (3d Cir. 1973).
271. The suit was brought under section 307 of the Clean Air Act 42 US CA§ 1857h-5(b)(l) (Supp. 1973), providing for review of the action of the Administrator of
EPA in the Courts ofAppeal. Another section ofthe Act, section 304(a) (d) 42 US CA§ 1857h-2(a)(d) (Supp. 1973), allows citizens to commerce suit against the Administrator
where there is an alleged non-discretionary failure to perform his duties under the Act
and authorizes the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to any party. The court of appeals
apparently believed that the authorization for fees in section 304(d) was sufficiently broad
so that it covered actions commenced under section 307. It is interesting to note that
despite the court's apparent reliance on statutory language to avoid the sovereign immun
ity bar itapparently adopted the private attorney general principle to justify its departure
from the no-fee rule.
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Similarly, the request for fees should not fall within the pen
umbra of actions for damages against officials. Regardless of the
ploy of naming an official as adefendant instead of the sovereign,
it is the power of the state which plaintiff seeks to control. If the
courts, based on whatever fictions they choose, permit plaintiff
to control abuses of that power, counsel fees should not be pre
cluded. Concern over the inhibitory effect such awards might
have on the fearless exercise of official discretion is overstated.
The United States will apparently pay the costs for which its
officials become liable while serving in their official capacity and
sued for an injunction.272 Acursory inspection of the docket in
almost any environmental case will show that, where an injunc
tion is sought to force governmental compliance with a statute,
it is government counsel which defends the action regardless of
who is named as defendant. Again, the unfairness of such selec
tive participation by the government in the lawsuit is manifest.
A favorite rallying point for the government has been the
consistently misconstrued statute waiving governmental immun
ity for some costs. It provides in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judg
ment for costs ... but not including the fees and expenses of
attorney may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil
action brought byoragainst the United Statesor any agency or
official ofthe United States acting in his official capacity, in any
court, having jurisdiction ofsuch action.273
The effect of the statutory language on its face is simply to state
an exception to the no-fee rule with respect to costs other than
counsel fees. This section gives express statutory permission for
some cost recoveries and declares that it is itself not a statutory
waiver ofthetraditional no-fee rule as tocounsel fees. It does not,
on the other hand, state a prohibition against any awards where
equity would otherwise compel them. Nevertheless, it has been
said that this provision "prohibits"274 the awarding ofattorneys
272. See Note, supra note 140, at 1247 n.149.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 1973).
274 6 J Moore, supra note 16, at H54.75[4], at 1558. In Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v' Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed June 22, 1973), the court in dicta
construed section 2412 as codifying the "usual rule" that attorneys' fees cannot be
awarded against the government unless astatute so provides. Id. at 2. See note 278 infra
and cases cited therein.
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fees. Yet the statutory language does no more than to simply
exclude attorneys' fees from its coverage.
In Cassata v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Asso
ciation,27" the court recognized that section 2412 "was merely a
grant of power to the courts ... it did not remove any power
formerly lodged in the courts."276 The court went on to deny coun
sel fees, even after recognizing at least a colorable common fund
argument,277 basing its refusal on a general argument of sovereign
immunity against attorneys' fees irrespective ofsection 2412. Al
though Cassata s strict reading of sovereign immunity notwith
standing its equitable jurisdiction over the case is troubling, at
least the court did not misread section 2412 as being other than
a neutral factor as far as counsel fees were concerned; it empha
sized that the statutory directive simply left the prior law unal
tered. However, in other litigation including several recent envi
ronmental cases,278 the courts did not recognize that section 2412
posed no barin itself, reading it instead as an explicit prohibition
against fee-shifting.279
To date the sovereign immunity and section 2412 defenses
have yielded in only a few exceptional cases, such as litigation
involving Indian tribes,280 possibly an occasional interpleader ac-
275. 445 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1971).
276. Id. at 125.
277. Id. at 124-25.
278. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 5 B.N.A. Environment Rep—Decisions 1745 (W.D.
Tex. 1973); Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 B.N.A. Environment Rep.—Decisions 1748
(CD. Calif. 1972), Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 4 B.N.A. Environment
Rep.—Decisions 1681 (D. Conn. 1972).
279. The only argument that could even credibly be made with respect to section
2412 might be that the exclusion of attorneys' fees signified congressional intention to
preserve the no-fee rule. One might respond that section 2412 states astatutory exception
rather than an equitable exception to the no-fee rule and therefore should be independent
ofany inferences from omissions from the statute. This response encounters the Fleisch
mann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967), reasoning thatwhere astatute
provides the remedies, other remedies should not be implied. See discussion of
Fleischmann in note 70 supra. It is not clear to what extent the Fleischmann reasoning
survives cases such as Mills and Hall, nor does it seem likely that such reasoning would
apply to statutes that do not statea cause ofaction butare generally remedial innature.
See generally note 69 supra.
280. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, Civil No. 70-2506 (D.D.C, filed
June 22, 1973). Here section 2412 and sovereign immunity principles were held inapplica
ble when Indians sought reimbursement for counsel fees. Where services of the Attorney
General were unavailable, despite his obligation to represent Indian tribes in all suits at
law and in equity, the tribes were entitled to seek counsel fees from the federal agency
defending the instant environmental case.
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tion,281 and in cases like Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Environmental Protection Agency where there was a statutory
provision authorizing the award of fees generally and granting a
citizen the right to commence suit against the agency. Claimants
in other cases are pressing arguments that certain governmental
entities are in fact governmental corporations and as such may
be liable for counsel fees.282 Notwithstanding these rays of light,
the federal sovereign immunity bar has presented a more onerous
impediment to fee-shifting than even the no-fee rule.
2. State Defendants
It should be noted at the outset that state sovereign immun
ity is by no means a universal practice among the states and in
fact has been described as "on the run."283 In regard to state
defendants in federal court,284 there are two possible lines of anal
ysis. The first approach is that of Fairmount Creamery Co. v.
United States™ and holds that the power to tax costs against the
state is a direct consequence of assuming federal question juris
diction, so that a circumvention of state sovereign immunity for
jurisdictional purposes concomitantly bars that defense for pur
poses of cost recovery.286 Once a federal statute has conferred
281. In General Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 430 F.2d 919 (10th Cir.
1970), plaintiff brought an interpleader action and one of the parties joined was the
government. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for counsel fees. Although the claimants, includ
ing the government, had recovered the full amount of their losses, it is not clear whether
the government received the interest to which it was entitled. In any event, plaintiff was
awarded counsel fees from the sums in the court registry, which perhaps could otherwise
have been claimed by the government to satisfy, ifapplicable, any interest owing on its
claim.
282. Governmental corporations are placed "uponequalfooting withprivate parties
as to the usual incidence ofsuits in relation to the payments ofcosts and allowances."
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1941); 6 J.
Moore, supra note 16, at 1 54.75[5], at 1561-62. Such an argument has been presented
in support of a claim for attorneys' fees in the Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 68-70,
Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, Civil No. 73-8174 (6th Cir. 1973, filed Nov. 21,
1973).
283. 3 K. Davis, supra note 257, at § 25.00, at 823 (Supp. 1970).
284. The availability ofawards against state defendants in state court depends on
two points: that there is no state statutory prohibition of recovery of fees as part of costs,
andthat officials areexplicitly orbyconvention liable for costs. See Note, supra note 257,
at 1253.
285. 275 U.S. 71 (1927).
286. Cf. Judge Peckham's footnote arguments sua sponte inLa Raza, 57 F.R.D. at
101-02, citing Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 71 (1927); Utah v. U.S.,
304 F.2d 25 (10thCir. 1962). 6 J. Moore, supra note 16, at § 54.76[1].
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jurisdiction against a government official, the Sims v. Amos court
said:
[T]he state has no power to impart to its officers any immunity
from such injunction or from its consequences, including the
court costs incident thereto.2"
The La Raza court chose the same route:
Since we conclude as the court did in Sims that the state may
no more immunize an individual from costs incident to an injunction than it may . . . from the injunction itself, we find that
sovereign immunity does not bar an award of attorney's fees
Alternatively some courts have argued that fee-shifting is
barred by sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment, be
cause despite the judicial fiction ofsuits against individual offi
cials it is nevertheless the state treasury which actually must pay
the awards.2*1 The latter appears to be the minority view in fee-
shifting decisions, however, and its eleventh amendment argu
ment isweakened both by its failure todistinguish between dam
age awards and fee-shifting29" and by current trends toward
awarding costs against the state in other areas ofthe law.291 Ab
sentextraordinary circumstances that operate to screen state de
fendants,292 state immunity does not appear to bar fee recovery.
287. 340 F. Supp. at 694.
288. 57 F.R.D. at 102.
289. Cf. Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970); Cal. Gov't Code §825
(West Supp. 1973). With or without specific statutes it appears that state officials would
have to pay costs out oftheir pockets in only the most extraordinary situations.
290. The merits ofthe arguments in the two cases are very different, ofcourse See
Note, supra note 10, at 1252 n.175.
„J^\ °f' C°St princiPles in welfare "ghts cases, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US 373(1971); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, granted sub nom., Edelman
v. Jordan, 412 U.S. 937 (1973). See also Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N DNY
1969), aff'd sub nom., Wyman v. Bowers, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).
292. Cf. Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 4 b!n.A. Environment Rep -
Decisions 1681 (D. Conn. 1972), where recovery against the state defendant was
barred because the state had relied upon the Federal Highway Administration's self-
serving .nterpretaton (in PPM 90-1 J 5.a) that NEPA did not apply to highway design
^oTTJoo',13 m0"thS after itS effective date- 4B-NA' Environment Rep.-DecisionsKW9, 1.W0-32. It is not clear how the state agency, which in that case had attempted to
assume the pnmary NEPA role (that ofpreparing the EIS) itself, could then claim insula
tion trom the terms of NEPA because of the federal memorandum. In any event such
examples should be restricted to their peculiar facts.
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One can only surmise that as greater success greets citizens
in prosecuting the private attorney general actions, more atten
tion may inevitably be drawn to the basic unfairness wrought
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, especially as applied to
the federal government.
V. Conclusion
The American no-fee rule is today justly coming under fire
for its policy and technical peculiarities. A general change or
revision of the rule, however, would require a careful, comprehen
sive reevaluation of the whole question of litigation costs. Pre
cipitous across-the-board reversal of the rule might well exacer
bate failings that already exist in our legal system. Yet, in ad
vance of a general reform, equity has recognized some circum
scribed areas oflitigation which amply justify waivers ofthe no-
fee rule on their own merits. The most dramatic of these excep
tions deals with public interest citizen suits.
Nowhere isthe need for public interest litigation more keenly
felt than in the environmental area. The continuing insult to our
environment will be no less tolerable tomorrow because it results
from a self-satisfying consumption of the environment today. It
serves no useful purpose here to add one more admonition to the
manifold outpourings of environmentalists concerning the limits
a people can abuse a finite entity with complete impunity. Nei
ther the legislatures nor the executive branches ofgovernment, as
presently constituted, are adequate to provide the ongoing evalu
ation and introspection needed to guard against improvident
destruction of the environment. Failures of our short-sighted
decision-making system create major irreversible or long-term
harms. The losses are doubly appalling because the system does
not adopt a self-correcting mechanism until it is too late.
It appears essential, at the very least, to subject private and
public decisions that will significantly affect the environment to
the scrutiny of the judicial process in adversary proceedings. One
means immediately at hand to accomplish this task is by foster
ing private citizens' public interest litigation. With the prospect
for award ofcounsel fees, the potential for such litigation issignif
icantly enhanced.
